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Abstract 
This paper investigates the distribution of the tax burden of the value added tax, VAT, in 
Switzerland. The current Swiss VAT system overall is slightly progressive, putting a higher tax 
burden on the high-income households. The analysis of different household types yields similar 
results. The results depend crucially on the measurement base adopted. It is however argued that 
the tax ratio as a proportion of expenditure pictures the tax burden of households from a lifetime 
perspective most realistically. A simulation is performed in order to evaluate the impact of a 
uniform consumption tax rate. While the VAT system would still be somewhat progressive, the 
reform is regressive, imposing a greater change in tax burden on low-income households.  
 
Keywords: consumption tax, VAT burden, income distribution, uniform VAT, Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
  
  ii 
Table of Contents 
1	   Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1	  
2	   Review: Consumption Taxes .................................................................................................... 4	  
2.1	   General Overview ................................................................................................................ 4	  
2.2	   Optimal Taxation ................................................................................................................. 5	  
2.3	   Rationale and Impact of Reduced or Zero Rates ................................................................. 7	  
2.4	   Distributional Effects: Empirical Evidence ......................................................................... 9	  
2.5	   Consumption Taxes in Switzerland ................................................................................... 12	  
3	   Data & Methodology ............................................................................................................... 15	  
3.1	   Research Approach ............................................................................................................ 15	  
3.2	   Data .................................................................................................................................... 15	  
3.2.1	   Household Budget Survey .......................................................................................... 16	  
3.2.2	   Income and Expenditure in the HBS .......................................................................... 16	  
3.3	   Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 18	  
3.3.1	   Assigning Tax Rates to Expenditure ........................................................................... 18	  
3.3.2	   Calculating Tax Burden Ratios ................................................................................... 18	  
3.4	   Assumptions and Limitations ............................................................................................. 21	  
3.4.1	   Assumptions ................................................................................................................ 21	  
3.4.2	   Limitations .................................................................................................................. 22	  
4	   Results ...................................................................................................................................... 26	  
4.1	   Value Added Tax Burden ................................................................................................... 26	  
4.1.1	   Tax Burden: With Respect to Income ......................................................................... 27	  
4.1.2	   Tax Burden: With Respect to Expenditure ................................................................. 28	  
4.1.3	   Tax Burden: Different Household Types .................................................................... 30	  
4.2	   Simulation: Uniform VAT Rate ......................................................................................... 35	  
4.2.1	   Simulation Results: With Respect to Income and Expenditure .................................. 36	  
4.2.2	   Simulation Results: Different Household Types ........................................................ 37	  
5	   Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 41	  
6	   Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 44	  
7	   References ................................................................................................................................ 45	  
Appendix A .................................................................................................................................... 49	  
Appendix B ..................................................................................................................................... 53	  
Appendix C .................................................................................................................................... 55	  
  iii 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Income and expenditure of households, 2006-2008 .......................................................... 17	  
Table 2: Income and expenditure of households, 2009-2011 .......................................................... 17	  
Table 3: Revenue under the existing tax structure .......................................................................... 26	  
Table 4: VAT burden across the income distribution (% of disposable income) ........................... 27	  
Table 5: VAT burden across the income distribution (% of expenditure) ...................................... 29	  
Table 6: VAT burden across income distribution and household type (% of disposable income). 31	  
Table 7: VAT burden across income distribution and household type (% of expenditure) ............ 33	  
Table 8: Simulated VAT burden across the income distribution .................................................... 36	  
Table 9: Simulated VAT burden across income distribution and household type (% of disposable 
income) ............................................................................................................................................ 38	  
Table 10: Simulated VAT burden across income distribution and household type (% of 
expenditure) ..................................................................................................................................... 39	  
Table 11: Components of the HBS and the corresponding VAT rate. Green: reduced rate, blue: 
special rate, orange: standard rate, white: exempted or free from VAT. ........................................ 49	  
Table 12: Components of the HBS and the corresponding post-reform tax rates. Purple: standard 
rate, white: exempted or free from VAT. ........................................................................................ 53	  
Table 13: Income and expenditure for single households ............................................................... 55	  
Table 14: Income and expenditure for couples ............................................................................... 55	  
Table 15: Income and expenditure for couples with children ......................................................... 56	  
Table 16: Income and expenditure for pensioners .......................................................................... 56	  
Table 17: Income and expenditure for pensioner couples ............................................................... 57	  
 
 
  iv 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Definition total expenditure ............................................................................................. 19	  
Figure 2: Definition disposable income .......................................................................................... 20	  
Figure 3: Average VAT payment per HH (% of disposable income) ............................................. 28	  
Figure 4: Average VAT payment per HH (% of expenditure) ........................................................ 29	  
Figure 5: VAT burden for different household types (% of disposable income), 2006-2008 ......... 31	  
Figure 6: VAT burden for different household types (% of disposable income), 2009-2011 ......... 32	  
Figure 7: VAT burden for different household types (% of expenditure), 2006-2008 ................... 33	  
Figure 8: VAT burden for different household types (% of expenditure), 2009-2011 ................... 34	  
Figure 9: Simulated average VAT payment per HH ....................................................................... 37	  
Figure 10: Simulated VAT burden for different household types (% of disposable income) ......... 38	  
Figure 11: Simulated VAT burden for different household types (% of expenditure) ................... 40	  
 
  v 
Abbreviation Index 
 
CPI – Consumer Price Index 
FDF – Federal Department of Finance  
FSIO – Federal Social Insurance Office 
FSO – Federal Statistical Office 
HBS – Household Budget Survey  
IFS – Institute for Fiscal Studies 
IHS – Institute for Advanced Studies 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
SCA – Swiss Customs Administration 
SFC – Swiss Federal Council  
STA – Swiss Tax Administration  
VAT – Value Added Tax 

  1 
1 Introduction  
Raising tax revenue in order to finance activities of the public sector is an important task of the 
government, and it is a challenging one. The first question is probably what to tax. A variety of 
tax mixes can be observed across countries (OECD, 2014b). Many governments rely heavily on 
labour taxation, followed by taxes on consumption. Additionally, capital income, property or 
bequests are taxed in some countries (ibid.). Next the question arises how a government should 
tax individuals? Flat rates or increasing marginal tax rates can be applied. Furthermore the 
collection mechanism has to be specified. One distinguishes between direct taxes such as income 
taxes, which are collected directly from the bearer of the tax, and indirect taxes like consumption 
taxes, which are collected from an intermediate (Crawford et al., 2007). While deciding on these 
questions, governments should keep in mind that taxes generally affect the behaviour of 
individuals, which is in most cases not desired, since it leads to inefficiencies and can decrease the 
tax base (Sandmo, 1976).  
Experiments show that individuals do not perceive income and consumption taxes equivalently. 
They adjust their behaviour more under an income tax scheme (Blumkin et al. 2010, p. 1210). 
This seems to be due to misperceptions of the different taxes. Even though individuals seem to 
care less about consumption taxes than about income taxes, the value added tax, VAT, is still 
perceived as a regressive tax, putting a higher burden on the poorer part of the society 
(OECD/KIPF 2014, p. 13). A recently published study by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) however shows that the existing VAT systems, when 
evaluated from a lifetime income perspective, are in most cases roughly proportional or even 
progressive, meaning that high-income households pay a higher share of their expenditure in VAT 
than low-income households (OECD/KIPF 2014, p. 13). The reduced rates for necessities in 
almost all OECD countries seem thus to have the desired effect of introducing progressivity in the 
value added tax system (OECD/KIPF 2014, p. 19). The question however is whether 
redistributive goals are reached efficiently through differentiated consumption taxes? Or would it 
be more efficient to use a uniform value added tax in order to achieve the main goal of 
consumption taxes, namely raising revenue? 
In the OECD, one third of total tax revenue is nowadays collected through consumption taxes 
(OECD 2014, p. 16). This is only slightly less than what is generated through income and profit 
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taxation and hence is an important part of the tax system (ibid.). In Switzerland the VAT, which is 
collected on the federal level, accounted for 37% of total federal tax revenue in 2014 (FTA, 
2015c). This is more than what was raised through the federal income tax. The share of VAT with 
respect to overall fiscal tax revenue was 20% in 2012 (OECD, 2014b). The value added tax 
constitutes a significant part of the tax system and it is therefore important to evaluate its impact 
and efficiency.  
Switzerland has a rather complicated VAT system with three different tax rates and 29 
exemptions (FDF 2015, pp. 15f). Suggestions to simplify the system with a uniform rate or only 
two different rates have been brought up regularly by various political actors, however, a reform 
has not been decided yet. An argument often mentioned is that a flat tax would hurt the poor 
relatively more and is therefore not just. Economists on the other hand argue that it would be 
optimal to broaden the tax base and levy an equal, but lower tax rate on all goods and services. 
The income tax system should then be used to pursue redistribution policies (Keschnigg, 2010). 
The underlying reasoning is that the value added tax is not efficient in achieving redistributive 
goals since it is not possible to satisfyingly distinguish the different income groups based on their 
consumption (ibid.).  
Is the current system really regressive, thus putting a higher tax burden on low-income households 
than on high-income households? What effects would a uniform tax rate further have on these 
distributional aspects? So far studies concerned with the Swiss VAT system only mention 
redistribution in a side note and do not quantify the tax burden borne by different income groups 
and household type using different measurement techniques. It is hence not clear which 
distributional effects a reform would have. To shed light on this issue, this paper replicates the 
above-mentioned OECD study for Switzerland and assesses first, the burden of VAT for different 
income groups and how this has changed over time. The tax burden is measured both in relation to 
disposable income and total expenditure. This distinction turns out to be crucial for the 
interpretation of the results. It is argued that the measurement with respect to total expenditure 
pictures the tax burden in a lifetime context more realistically (OECD/KIPF 2014, pp. 30ff). Five 
different household types are analysed and the changes between two survey periods, 2006-2008 
and 2009-2011, are laid out. In a second step it is calculated how high a uniform rate would need 
to be in order to be revenue neutral. With this estimated tax rate, assuming that households do not 
significantly alter their consumption behaviour, the tax burden in a system of a flat rate with only 
a few exemptions is calculated. Thereby this paper follows a reform proposal made by the Federal 
Council in 2008. Again the tax burden is estimated in relation to disposable income and total 
expenditure. The distributional effects of such a reform are analysed.  
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Despite the on-going policy debate and consensus that the system should be simplified, there is a 
surprising lack of evidence that founds the arguments of different parties (Amrein, 2014). This 
paper contributes to the debate by investigating the distribution of the tax burden and the effects 
of a uniform rate with respect to distributional aspects. It also discusses the important balance 
between equity and efficiency of a tax system. The desired features of a tax system are 
contradictory: The tax should be efficient, that means, not distort people’s decisions, it should 
raise a certain amount of revenue and it should account for the society’s aversion against 
inequality (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1976). A tax system that promotes equity comes at the cost of 
efficiency and vice-versa. Therefore one should look for the most efficient solution to reach the 
desired level of redistribution. Discussing the tax system and its implications regarding income 
distribution or efficiency is important: everyone is affected by it, yet the topic is often either left 
to tax experts and specific interest groups, who want to increase their benefits from it, or it is 
discussed from an ideological perspective. While the question about the degree of redistribution is 
a normative one, the question of how to best reach this degree can be analysed from an economic 
perspective.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first gives an overview of 
consumption taxation. Furthermore the theory on optimal taxation, specifically with respect to 
consumption taxation, is introduced. The rationale and impact of reduced tax rates is discussed. 
After presenting results from empirical studies concerning the distributional aspects of the VAT, 
the research question is put into context; therefore the Swiss situation is shortly described. Section 
3 lays out the research approach, the data and the method. In section 4 the results of the analysis 
are presented. The results are discussed and the approach used here is critically reflected on in 
section 5. The paper concludes with a policy recommendation and ideas for further research.  
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2 Review: Consumption Taxes 
This section first gives an insight into consumption taxation. Next, it discusses the theory of 
optimal taxation with respect to consumption taxation. Subsequently the rationale and impact of 
VAT rate differentiation is evaluated. Furthermore the distributional effects of the VAT are 
discussed and empirical evidence is presented. Finally the Swiss situation is laid out.  
2.1 General Overview 
There are two sorts of consumption taxes, first general consumption taxes like the value added tax 
or retail sales taxes, and second, excise taxes on specific goods like tobacco, alcohol and fuels 
(OECD 2014, p. 14). While the amount of consumption taxes with respect to total tax revenue has 
been relatively stable during the last 45 years, the composition has changed significantly. Revenue 
from excise taxes dropped remarkably in the OECD countries and accounts today for a smaller 
share than in previous years. In 2012 total consumption tax revenue in the OECD consisted of 
one-third excise tax revenue and two thirds VAT revenue (OECD 2014, pp. 15f).  
While excise taxes have been used as a relatively easy way to collect revenue in the past, their 
main purpose nowadays is to discourage the use of certain goods because of health or 
environmental consequences (OECD 2014, p. 23). Negative externalities can be internalized 
through excise taxes. In this case the otherwise favoured neutrality principle is turned the opposite 
way: Knowing that consumers react to taxes the purpose of the tax is now to be distortionary and 
to induce or prevent certain behaviours (ibid.). The main goal with this kind of taxation is to 
eventually decrease the tax base. A general consumption tax on the other hand is an essential 
instrument to raise revenue and should not influence the tax base. Consumption taxes are also 
used for redistributive policies and the promotion of certain merit goods such as cultural goods, 
books and newspapers (OECD 2014, p. 51). It follows from their definition that excise taxes are 
inherently different from general consumption taxes and thus they are excluded from the analysis 
in this paper.  
When it comes to consumption taxes the main distinction between the VAT and the retail sales tax 
is the fact that the VAT is levied on each level of the production process with the possibility to 
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deduct paid tax on purchases. This way it can be ensured that only the final consumer bears the 
tax burden (Keen & Lockwood 2010, p. 139). With an unbroken crediting chain and properly 
charged imports the tax incidence lies on the consumer (ibid.). In contrast, with a single-stage 
retail sales tax it is often difficult to determine the final consumer and hence possibilities for 
evasion open up (ibid.). A turnover tax on the other hand leads to production inefficiencies, since 
it is levied on the whole turnover, and thus also on intermediates. This induces firms to produce 
intermediate goods themselves, even though this might not be optimal (Bodin et al., 2001). It is 
these advantages that have resulted in the popularity of the VAT nowadays. If imposed properly, 
it is a tax on final consumption with very strong incentives for the tax collecting entity, the firms, 
to comply with the rules (OECD, 2014). 
After having distinguished the different types of consumption taxes, we now turn to the theory of 
optimal taxation. Since this paper is concerned with consumption taxes, the focus of the next 
section lies on optimal taxation with respect to consumption taxes. 
2.2 Optimal Taxation 
In general a tax system is understood to be optimal when its deadweight loss, caused by distorting 
individuals’ decisions, is minimised (Sandmo 1976, pp. 37f). It should thus be as neutral as 
possible. In specific, the Diamond-Mirrlees production efficiency theorem states that, under 
certain assumptions, a Pareto optimal tax system leaves production decisions undistorted 
(Crawford et al. 2007, p. 283). There is a widespread view that taxing consumption is superior to 
taxing income since the resulting distortions on the labour market are smaller than with an 
equivalent income tax (Bosch & van den Noord, 1990). Taxing labour is often understood as 
subsidising leisure. The distortions arising therefrom could be removed by taxing goods that are 
complements to leisure more heavily (ibid.).  
Optimal taxation with respect to consumption taxes has long been discussed solely from an 
efficiency viewpoint (Atkinson & Stiglitz 1976, p. 59). From this perspective taxes are most 
effective if they are inversely proportional to demand elasticities because this results in the least 
distortional outcome (ibid. p. 62). Goods with a very inelastic demand, for instance food, should 
thus be taxed heavily. Individuals will not alter their behaviour and the deadweight loss of the tax 
is small. This general rule of taxation is named after the philosopher and economist Frank P. 
Ramsey who first proposed it in 1927.  
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𝜏! = 𝜆1 + 2𝜆    1𝜂! 
Here, 𝜏!, is the tax per unit on good i. 𝜆 can be seen as the marginal deadweight loss of 
government spending. 𝜂! is the magnitude of the demand elasticity of good i. The demand 
elasticity enters the formula inversely. The tax rate on good i thus depends on the inverse demand 
elasticity of the good in question, which means that the tax is higher the more inelastic the 
demand for good i is. Moreover the tax rate increases with the marginal deadweight loss of 
government spending. The formula is derived from the minimisation of the deadweight loss of a 
commodity tax with a certain revenue requirement (Atkinson & Stiglitz 1980, pp. 370ff).  
If distributional considerations are taken into account the Ramsey-rule however changes and it 
becomes favourable to tax goods that are price elastic. To which extent this should be done 
depends on the preferences for equality in a society (Atkinson & Stiglitz 1976, p. 62). There is 
hence no general rule to follow.  
Besides analysing the isolated case of consumption taxation Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) also 
investigate the case of a combined tax system with an optimal linear income tax. It is 
straightforward that analysing only one component of a broad tax system does not allow for an 
overall assessment. The authors state that a progressive income tax influences equity aspects as 
well as the efficiency of the system and therefore impacts the setting of optimal consumption tax 
rates (Atkinson & Stiglitz 1976, p. 64). Their main result is that indirect taxation is not needed in 
case an optimal linear income tax exists. If consumption patterns do not depend on the pre-tax 
labour income and hence individuals have the same shares of spending regardless of their income, 
there is no additional information on the individual’s ability to pay available in the expenditure 
pattern that could not be observed through the wage (Bodin et al. 2001, ch. 7). It follows that it is 
more efficient to tax exclusively labour income.  
Kaplow (2004) shows that the theoretical results from Atkinson and Stiglitz do not only hold for 
an optimal income tax but for any sort of income tax and concludes further that a differentiated 
consumption tax is never favourable (2004, p. 1). He states that the reason for the introduction of 
differentiated consumption tax rates is to pursue redistribution policies that are less distorting than 
the ones through the personal income tax (ibid. p. 2). However, according to Kaplow, different 
rates of a consumption tax are not able to minimise these distortions, but rather introduce new 
ones by altering consumption choices (ibid.). Removing differentiated consumption taxes hence 
results in a Pareto improvement, even if only a partial reform is considered (ibid. p. 15). 
Additionally Kaplow employs an adjustment in the income tax system in order to simulate a 
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commodity tax reform, which is distributionally neutral (ibid.). By considering the tax system as a 
whole and holding the degree of redistribution constant this study is particularly valuable for 
policy discussions. The results by Atkinson & Stiglitz and Kaplow are however criticised by other 
economists because of the assumption that preferences are weakly separable between 
consumption and leisure, that is, spending patterns do not vary across income groups (Bodin et al. 
2001, ch. 7). This assumption does not coincide with empirical results and is thus seen overly 
restrictive and unrealistic (ibid.).  
Two papers, which do not make use of the assumption of weakly separable preferences, do 
nevertheless come to similar conclusions: Besely and Jewitt (1995) establish that a uniform 
consumer tax is favourable in a single consumer case while Deaton and Stern (1986) find that 
uniform consumption taxation is optimal in the presence of an optimal linear income tax.   
A general conclusion is that the optimal consumption tax depends heavily on the other 
instruments available. When income taxation is not feasible, as it is the case in many developing 
countries, differentiated consumption tax rates might be the only way to achieve distributional 
goals. If however a wide range of well-functioning tax instruments through which redistribution 
can take place exists, a uniform consumption tax seems favourable (Bodin et al. 2001, ch. 7). This 
can also be explained by the fact that the scope for redistribution via different rates for goods is 
not large (ibid.).  
Nonetheless in most cases VAT systems are in fact operated with different rates. The rationale 
and impact of this instrument is discussed in the subsequent section.  
2.3 Rationale and Impact of Reduced or Zero Rates 
What are the advantages of reduced rates on certain goods? While the theory of optimal taxation 
favours uniform consumption taxation, there are still various arguments raised for the case of 
differentiated rates. One group of arguments can be classified as the efficiency arguments, while 
the other belongs to the equity category. The former argues that reduced rates can increase total 
productivity by giving individuals an incentive to spend less time on low productive do-it-yourself 
work and more time on their jobs instead. A distortion caused by the income tax system should 
hence be minimised through differentiated consumption tax rates. Moreover reduced rates are said 
to lower the cost of low-skilled labour and hence decrease structural unemployment (Copenhagen 
Economics 2007, p. 12). Arguments falling within the equity category stress that reduced rates 
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can benefit low-income households and correct for rising income inequality. Furthermore they 
enlarge the demand for merit goods such as cultural goods and thereby broaden the access to them 
for everyone in society (ibid.). Reductions or exemptions are often applied to food, newspapers, 
pharmaceuticals, water supply and cultural goods (OECD/KIPF 2014, p. 19).  
Nevertheless, equally important to note is that higher VAT rates might have the same effect as 
reduced rates – but in the opposite direction. When reduced rates are introduced usually the 
standard rate is increased in order to collect the revenue foregone. This increase in the standard 
rate can suppress demand for the respective goods and hence employment. Therefore, the effect of 
reduced rate might very likely be nullified (Copenhagen Economics 2007, p. 11). The report by 
Copenhagen Economics models the effects that reduced rates for efficiency purposes have. The 
effects tend to be mostly short-term (2007, p. 27). Taking into consideration the administrative 
costs related with reduced rates, it is questionable how efficient reduced rates are in achieving 
their objective of increasing productivity or reducing structural unemployment.   
Turning to the category of equity arguments, many studies find that reduced rates benefit the poor 
proportionally more. An overview on this empirical work concerned with the distributional effects 
of the VAT is provided in the next section. Most countries apply VAT systems with reduced rates 
for necessities such as food. There is however some controversy over the effectiveness of this 
measure. Critics claim repeatedly that the distributional effects of the VAT are at most chaotic 
(Amrein, 2014). Calculations from the OECD show that in absolute, cash terms the rich profit 
more from reduced tax rates than the poor, however the poor benefit more with respect to their 
expenditure (OECD 2014, p. 52). This result holds for the reduced rate on food. From the reduced 
rates on books, museums and cultural events the rich even profit more proportionally (IFS 2011, 
p. 390 and OECD/KIPF 2014, p. 60). Similarly, in Switzerland for every Franc the poor profit 
from the reduced rate on food, the rich get a 2 Franc benefit (Swiss Federal Council 2010, p. 
5406). Given this result it is reasonable to ask whether reduced rates are the best way to do 
distribution policy. If a separation between goods consumed by low-income and high-income 
households is not possible, because there are no specific goods consumed solely by a certain 
group, reduced consumption tax rates will necessarily lead to this so-called mechanical revenue 
loss (Copenhagen Economics 2007, p. 6). Even though the tax might fulfil its purpose of relieving 
the poor, it has the side effect of relieving the rich even more. Besides not efficiently achieving 
the equity goal, the reduced rates or exemptions, which lead to a hidden tax can moreover distort 
input choices and provide an incentive for self-supply (Bodin et al., 2001). Reduced rates and 
exemptions are also said to generally bias investment and production decisions (ibid.).  
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Another argument against reduced rates comes from a political economy perspective and states 
that a system with reduced rates and many exemptions usually leads to exemption creep. This 
term refers to a process in which one exemption gives rise to requests for another, both 
downstream and upstream in the production process (Bodin et al., 2001). If food is exempted from 
VAT, this enhances pressure for exemptions of agricultural input products. The same applies to 
the other direction: If a firm uses exempted input goods and produces goods that are taxable, there 
is an interest to obtain an exemption for the respective taxable good (ibid.).  
Weighing the different arguments, the existence of reduced rates or exemptions can be better 
justified on equity than on efficiency grounds. Empirical studies on the equity effects of the VAT 
are discussed in the next section.  
2.4 Distributional Effects: Empirical Evidence 
Empirical studies on the distributional effect of the VAT have been conducted for different 
countries, mainly in Europe, and some of the results from this research are presented here. Talking 
about income distribution, it should be clarified that a tax is considered to be progressive if it hits 
high-income individuals proportionally harder than low-income individuals and regressive the 
other way round (IFS 2011, pp. 364f).  
Leahy, Lyons and Tol (2011) analyse the impact of the VAT on income distribution in Ireland. 
The authors use a household survey and perform simulations for various tax rates (2011, p. 214). 
They find that the current VAT system is highly regressive, with a tax burden in respect to income 
of 16% for the lowest income decile and 6% for the highest income decile (ibid. p. 219). Single 
parents households pay the highest share of income in VAT while couples pay the lowest amount 
(ibid.). Exploring reform possibilities, the authors find a flat rate of 10.9% (compared to a 
standard rate of 21% and a reduced rate of 13,5% today) on all goods and services to be 
distributionally neutral and to raise almost the same amount of revenue (ibid. p. 220). Due to the 
fact that a uniform tax rate would lower administrative costs, the small revenue loss of 0.6% of 
total VAT revenue collected could possibly be offset (ibid.). Leahy, Lyons and Tol moreover 
discuss the implications of other possible reforms such as zero-rating all foods or introducing a 
reduced rate on fuels. They also examine the planned increase in the standard rate, which 
according to them will result in an even more regressive value added tax system (ibid. p. 228). In 
contrast to the OECD study on the distributional impact of the VAT, the study for Ireland always 
  10 
measures the VAT burden as a percentage of disposable income, which might partly explain the 
high degree of regressivity.  
Decoster et al. (2010) analyses the distributional impact of the consumption tax system in five 
European countries, namely the UK, Ireland, Belgium, Greece and Hungary, and find that taxing 
consumption is regressive in all countries when measured with respect to disposable income. They 
supply evidence that this result is due to the regressivity of both the excise tax and the value added 
tax system (Decoster et al. 2010, p. 347). However, taking total expenditure as a base they find a 
progressive consumption tax system (ibid.). Moreover, the authors use a micro simulation 
program for the European Union countries, EUROMOD, to perform an ex-ante evaluation of 
possible policy reforms that shift the tax burden from labour to consumption by lowering the 
social insurance contributions from employees by 25% and increasing the VAT such that the 
reform is revenue neutral (ibid. pp. 340ff). Such a substantial shift in the tax structure results in a 
more regressive tax system in all the studied countries (ibid. p. 342). According to Decoster et al. 
the reason for this is the indirect tax system being less progressive than the system of employee 
social insurance contributions (ibid. p. 346). Thus, the authors conclude that if a government 
wants to keep the current level of income redistribution, a shift from labour to consumption 
taxation has to be accompanied by an increase in progressivity in the personal income tax (ibid.). 
O’Donoghue et al. (2004) analyses consumption taxes in Europe with respect to their 
redistributive effect. Twelve countries are evaluated using the EUROMOD tax-benefit model. In a 
first step the progressivity of indirect taxes is measured and then, in a second step their 
redistributive impact is assessed and compared to other policy instruments (ibid. p. 1). The 
authors consider VAT, excise taxes and ad valorem taxes, which are based on the value of the 
product (ibid. p. 2). They find VAT to be proportional or slightly progressive when measured as a 
proportion of total expenditure and regressive when measured as a share of disposable income 
(ibid. p. 10). Turning to the results of the redistribution analysis, O’Donoghue et al. states that, for 
all countries, consumption taxes put a higher burden on low-income households than on high-
income households and are thus negatively redistributive (ibid. p. 13). Compared to the other 
policy instruments and components of the overall tax system, VAT and excise duties have a minor 
redistributive effect (ibid. p. 21). This supports the theoretical notion that the scope for 
redistribution through consumption taxes is limited (Bodin et al. 2001, ch. 7).  
The OECD study mentioned before (OECD/KIPF, 2014) investigates, besides analysing a sample 
of OECD countries, the country-specific situation in Korea. The VAT accounts for the greatest 
share of tax revenue in Korea. Most of the resources are collected through a low single rate tax. 
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The tax burden from the value added tax is regressive, when measured as a proportion of income 
and progressive when measured as a share of expenditure across income deciles (OECD/KIPF 
2014, pp. 77ff). The main result so far, that is, that the base of measurement is crucial for the 
interpretation of the distributional impact of the VAT, holds in this case as well. What 
distinguishes the study about Korea from other studies is the definition of expenditure, which 
takes pre-tax expenditure as the measure of expenditure. Hence, all tax paid in VAT or in excise 
duties is subtracted from total expenditure before calculating the VAT burden (ibid. p. 77). This 
can be criticised as it implies that the VAT burden depends on the excise tax burden. To illustrate, 
a household, which spends a substantial amount in excise taxes seems to bear a higher VAT 
burden than a household with equivalent total expenditure and equivalent VAT spending in cash 
but with a lower share of spending in excise tax. Even though these households are equivalent 
with respect to their VAT spending and with respect to their total expenditure, they appear to 
shoulder different VAT burdens.  
What the empirical studies presented here have in common is their focus on the measurement of 
the tax burden. They stress the differences in results one obtains when changing the base of 
measurement and provide arguments for both alternatives. The pattern is clear: Taking 
expenditure as a base results in proportional or slightly progressive VAT systems, whereas the 
picture changes when the tax burden is calculated with respect to disposable income. The question 
hence is which measurement is more reasonable or realistic and should provide a guideline for 
how to design a tax system. This is discussed more comprehensively in section 3.3.2. 
A factor that is not assessed in detail by the papers presented is the question of actual tax 
incidence. It is not clear whether the economic incidence always lies on the consumer, although 
this should be the case. There might be less-than-full pass-through as well as more-than-full pass-
through of the value added tax. If a firm has monopolistic power, it will probably pass the tax 
fully on the consumer. In contrast, if a firm faces decreasing demand, it might decide to not fully 
pass-through the tax in order to lower the consumer prices. However, due to lack of data full tax 
shifting is commonly assumed. Warren (2008, p. 14) criticises this assumption and stresses that 
the main challenge consists of measuring the real tax burden on individuals or households even 
though this might be complicated and data requirements might be higher.  
Since the aim of this paper is to perform an analysis of the distributional effects of the VAT in 
Switzerland, the Swiss taxation system is introduced before turning to the data. 
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2.5 Consumption Taxes in Switzerland 
 
The Swiss taxation system is organised according to a principle of subsidiarity. Taxes are hence 
levied on a federal, regional and communal level. The value added tax, which was introduced 
1995 in order to replace a sales tax on goods, is levied at the federal level (FDF 2015, p. 15).  The 
VAT (in the Swiss context called MwSt, Mehrwertsteuer) is a general consumption tax that is 
collected on all levels of production, trade and the service sector within Switzerland, on the 
purchase of services from companies abroad and on the import of goods (ibid.). Every business 
has to be registered and pay VAT if the turnover is above a certain threshold. In 2010 this 
threshold was raised from 75,000 CHF to 100,0000 CHF (FTA, 2015b).  
 
While the base of taxation is the consumer, businesses collect and pay the tax. Taxes on inputs 
purchased for production can be deducted. This so-called pre-tax-deduction prevents that the same 
good is taxed more than once. Thus, even though the tax is levied at every stage of the production 
process, the tax burden is borne by the final consumer (OECD 2014, p. 18). With the possibility to 
credit the tax, distortions in production or investment decisions should be prevented (ibid.). It also 
introduces significant costs for tax avoidance. A firm who wants to avoid the tax is not able to 
credit the tax paid on purchases and therefore has higher input costs than its competitors. Together 
with the risk of detection and the expected punishment the drawbacks of tax avoidance soon 
become larger than its profits. 
 
Three different tax rates exist in Switzerland and there are several goods and services, which are 
either free from the tax or exempted. This difference is important: Companies producing goods 
and services, which are free from VAT can make use of pre-tax-deduction and get money back 
paid on purchases, while those producing goods and services that are exempted from the tax 
cannot do this (FDF 2015, p. 16). When the deduction of taxes on purchased goods is not 
possible, the tax burden is not fully borne by the consumer but stays partly within the production 
process. This so-called taxe occulte, hidden tax, is said to be inefficient and to hinder investment 
(Schaltegger et al., 2005). Reduced tax rates can create such effects as well. The extent to which 
exemptions distort decision-making within a firm depends on the stage of the production process 
where the tax applies. It is not very problematic if the hidden tax occurs at the last stage of the 
production process, in this case firms might just pass the tax through to the consumer via higher 
prices. If the hidden tax however applies to intermediate goods, cascading price effects can be 
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observed, which produce incentives for vertical integration, that means firms decide to produce 
the inputs themselves (OECD 2014, p. 47).  
Since the 1st of January 2011 the applied rates are: 
- 8.0% as the standard rate (7.6% prior to 2011) 
- 2.5% as a reduced rate on: food; cattle, poultry and fish; cut flowers, living plants and 
seeds; wheat; feedstuff and fertiliser; medication; newspapers, magazines and books; 
services and goods from public radio and television stations (previously 2.4%) 
- 3.8% as a special rate on accommodation services, hotel business and rental services for 
holiday homes (previously 3.6%) 
In the category of exempted goods belong services in the health sector, within social help, 
education, childcare, cultural services, insurance services as well as turnovers in the financial 
sector, long-term rental services, bets and the lottery. Insurance services and turnover in the 
financial sector are mainly exempted because of their difficulty to be taxed. The other services are 
exempted for social reasons or because of economic conditions (FTA, 2015d). Free from VAT 
and therefore applicable for pre-tax-deductions are all goods produced for export, transportation 
services across the border as well as services, which are used abroad (FDF 2015, p. 16).  
The history of the reduced rates goes back until 1941 when a turnover tax was introduced in 
Switzerland (economiesuisse 2013, p. 9). Goods classified as necessities were taxed with a lower 
rate, because especially poor households allocated a substantial share of their income to such 
goods. For instance the amount spent on food accounted for more than 35% of a household’s 
income in 1941, while today this share is approximately 7% (ibid.). Besides distributional aspects, 
the reduced rates are also used to induce the consumption of goods, which are seen as merit goods 
such as cultural goods, books and newspapers (OECD 2014, p. 51).  
The personal income tax is the most important source of fiscal revenue in Switzerland (OECD, 
2014b). It is followed by the VAT, which accounts for 20% of total tax revenue (ibid.). The 
revenue from the VAT was 22,561 billion Swiss francs in 2013 (FTA, 2015a). Other taxes and 
fees levied are excise taxes on beer, spirits, tobacco, petroleum, a tax on automobiles, a fee for 
heavy vehicles, a CO2 tax and a fee on volatile organic compounds (SCA, 2015b). As these taxes 
serve another purpose they are not going to be considered further. 
The VAT system is viewed as complicated and the reduced rates inefficient when it comes to their 
purpose (Keschnigg, 2010). A simplification of the system would therefore include the 
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elimination of at least some exemptions. In 2008 the Federal Council suggested a reform of the 
VAT that included the elimination of the reduced rates as well as of many exemptions (Swiss 
Federal Council, 2008). However, the reform did not pass parliament. A main argument was that 
it would hit the poor proportionally harder. Moreover, particular political interests from groups 
that benefit from reduced rates nowadays prevented the reform from being successful.  
In order to see whether such a reform indeed would have a regressive impact and generally to 
evaluate what the effects of a uniform VAT rate are, the proposal is used for the simulation of the 
uniform tax.  
Summing up, this section introduced the functioning of the value added tax and its prevalence 
today. The theory of optimal taxation was illustrated and the arguments for rate differentiation 
were evaluated. After presenting empirical research with respect to the distributional aspects of 
consumption taxed, the situation in Switzerland was laid out such that one can now turn to the 
data.  
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3 Data & Methodology 
This chapter describes the research approach, the data and the methodology. Furthermore 
assumptions and limitations of the chosen approach are discussed.  
3.1 Research Approach 
The aim of the paper is to assess the distribution of the VAT burden in Switzerland and to 
simulate a uniform tax rate whose effects are analysed with respect to distributional aspects. In the 
Swiss Household Budget Survey (HBS) detailed data on household consumption is available, 
which makes it possible to estimate the amount of VAT paid by the household. The model is 
constructed by matching expenditure from the household survey to its corresponding tax rates. 
The amount of VAT paid by the households is then calculated for different household types, 
across income quintiles by applying the tax rates to the corresponding amounts of expenditure. 
The tax burden is measured as the share of VAT spending in relation to disposable income and 
total expenditure. In order to simulate the effects of a flat value added tax, the estimated tax 
revenue, which will be compared to the actual revenue, is used to calculate the tax rate needed on 
all consumption goods for the reform to be revenue neutral. Assuming that households do not 
significantly alter their behaviour, the tax burden in a system of a uniform rate with very few 
exemptions is calculated. Again the tax burden is estimated in relation to disposable income and 
expenditure. The distributional effects of such a reform are analysed. Underlying assumptions and 
limitations of this approach are discussed in detail in section 3.4.  
3.2  Data  
This section describes first the Household Budget Survey before showing some descriptive 
statistics about the income and expenditure in the survey.  
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3.2.1 Household Budget Survey 
This data is taken from the Swiss Household Budget Survey (HBS), which each year randomly 
selects households to keep track of their expenditures for one month. Socio-economic indicators 
and information are asked to complete the survey.  
The sample population of the Household Budget Survey is the permanent resident Swiss 
population and the sample units are private households. Collective households such as prisons or 
elderly care homes are thus not included. Each year approximately 3000 households participate in 
the survey. The selection of participating households is done randomly by drawing households 
from the Swiss Statistical Office’s random sample register (FSO, 2013a). Telephone interviews 
and written questionnaires are the means by which the survey is conducted. The focus of the 
survey lies on the consumption and income of the households. Other characteristics such as size 
and type of household, major region and linguistic region, income bracket, age and gender of 
reference person as well as the status of household occupants, that is, whether they are tenants or 
owners, are asked additionally. The data is weighted on three different levels in order to ensure a 
representative picture of the Swiss population. First the sample is weighted according to the 
including probability. Then the probability of participation of a household is taken into account by 
considering certain other variables like the socio-economic background of a household. In a last 
step a calibration method, which is based on the known distribution of the Swiss population, is 
applied (FSO 2013a, p. 8). Biases due to household selection and participation should be 
minimised by this procedure. The results from the survey are subsumed in periods of three years 
(ibid.). 
The data used for this analysis is weighted and aggregated data; specifically the data is aggregated 
across income quintiles, based on gross income. Data from 2006-2008 and 2009-2011 is used. 
While the focus lies on the current distributional aspects, the development over time will be 
analysed shortly as well. Problems arising due to the data structure will be discussed in section 
3.4.2.  
3.2.2 Income and Expenditure in the HBS 
The following two tables show the income distribution in the two survey periods. One observes 
that in both periods total expenditure is greater than disposable income for the first and the second 
quintile. Expenditure almost equals disposable income for the third quintile in 2006-2008. The 
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forth and the fifth quintile spend clearly less than their disposable income. This shows that 
borrowing and saving patterns are present.  
Table 1: Income and expenditure of households, 2006-2008 
 Gross Income Disposable Income Total expenditure 
All households 8916 6338 5826 
Poorest 
(below 4610) 
 
3244 2332 3223 
2nd quintile 
(4610-6674) 
 
5700 4132 4364 
3rd quintile 
(6675-8953) 
 
7758 5586 5466 
4th quintile 
(8954-1230) 
 
10494 7558 6700 
Richest 
(above 12321) 17377 12080 9377 
Note: Values in CHF. Thresholds for income quintiles in parentheses. Source: Author’s elaboration, based on 
HBS (FSO, 2014). 
The difference in the average gross income between the first and the second survey period is CHF 
614. The disposable income increased by CHF 403 and total expenditure by CHF 159. It can be 
observed that the gross income for the first two quintiles increased by roughly half of the average 
amount, while it was substantially more for the high-income households.  
Table 2: Income and expenditure of households, 2009-2011 
 Gross Income Disposable Income Total expenditure 
All households 9530 6741 5985 
Poorest 
(below 4880) 
 
3475 2538 3354 
2nd quintile 
(4880-7173) 
 
6053 4299 4535 
3rd quintile 
(7174-9702) 
 
8414 6074 5657 
4th quintile 
(9703-13170) 
 
11255 8108 6877 
Richest 
(above 13171) 18448 12682 9501 
Note: Values in CHF. Thresholds for income quintiles in parentheses. Source: Author’s elaboration, based on 
HBS (FSO, 2014).  
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Information about the income and expenditure of the different household types can be found in 
Appendix C.  
3.3 Methodology 
This section describes the methodology applied and introduces the definitions needed in order to 
analyse the distributional effects of the value added tax. Moreover, assumptions and limitations of 
the analysis are discussed. 
3.3.1 Assigning Tax Rates to Expenditure 
The first step in this data analysis is to match categories of expenditures to different tax rates. 
There are 361 expenditure items in the survey. Hence the sub-categories are very specific, which 
makes the analysis possible in the first place. Even though the categories are accurate, it is not 
always straightforward to determine the corresponding tax rate. To illustrate, one can look at the 
category of Package trips. Here the tax rate is difficult to assign, as first one cannot separate the 
expenditure for transportation, accommodation and restaurants. If transportation is by air, it is free 
from VAT. Accommodation would be taxed with a special rate, if it were in Switzerland. 
However, as most package trips have a destination abroad, the whole category is declared as 
exempted. A table (Table 11) with all categories and the respective tax rate can be found in 
Appendix A. If the matching was not straightforward, the problems with the category and the 
arguments are shortly described. After having assigned tax rates to the various categories of goods 
and services, expenditures of goods of the same tax rates are added and the amount of tax paid is 
calculated. This is done for the three different tax rates to obtain the total amount of VAT paid per 
household. 
3.3.2 Calculating Tax Burden Ratios 
Subsequently tax burden ratios are calculated. Two different measures are considered: VAT 
burden as a share of disposable income and VAT burden as a share of total expenditure. There are 
different arguments for the two measures.  
While VAT burden with respect to disposable income gives a valid picture of the actual situation, 
it is seen as inadequate to assess the tax burden in a lifetime context (OECD/KIPF 2014, p. 36). 
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This is because the effect of borrowing and saving is not taken into account. To illustrate, the 
savings in one period will result in expenditure in a future period and hence be taxed. Or they are 
used to pay back loans or credits with which taxed consumption has been financed in the past 
(ibid. p. 34). The high income today will thus likely be subject to VAT in a lifetime context. To 
remove these effects of saving and borrowing, an expenditure-based approach is chosen. For 
example students are temporarily poor and have probably a rather high expenditure because they 
have student loans. The VAT burden they face now does not reflect adequately the tax burden 
they face over their lifetime, as they will earn more and hence incur a lower tax burden during 
their working life. According to the life-cycle theory by Modigliani and Brumberg, consumption-
spending patterns are more stable during a lifetime than incomes as individuals adjust their saving 
and borrowing behaviour in different cycles of life in order to smooth consumption (Deaton, 
2005). It could be observed in Table 1 and Table 2 that patterns of savings are present and they 
seem to be rather strong for some income groups. These patterns can also be observed for 
different household types, see Appendix C. Consequently, when analysing distributional effects, it 
seems superior to look at the tax burden as a proportion of expenditure.  
Total expenditure is defined as consumption expenditures (including housing) plus the category of 
“other expenditures”, including optional insurances, fees and gifts. 
Figure 1: Definition total expenditure 
 
Source: Author's elaboration according to HBS (FSO, 2014). 
On the other hand the income-based approach is superior in the way it already takes into account 
the effects on the tax and transfer system. The figure below shows how disposable income is 
defined in the Household Budget Survey. The same definition of disposable income is used in the 
tax-benefit micro simulation model for the European Union, EUROMOD, which is applied in 
some of the studies mentioned above. 
_____________________________________ 
Consumption expenditure 
+ other expenditures (insurances, fees, gifts) 
_____________________________________!
= Total expenditure  
_____________________________________!
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Figure 2: Definition disposable income 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration according to HBS (FSO, 2014). 
Because taxes as well as social-security benefits are included in the calculation of disposable 
income, the distributional effects of the income tax and the transfer system are considered. This 
means that we are looking at the actual situation and simulate a reform solely concerning the 
VAT, accounting for the other parts of the tax system and holding them constant. 
The results of this analysis are presented across the income distribution (income quintiles are 
used, based on gross income) in the two waves of the survey. Hence income is used to measure 
whether a household is rich or poor. Expenditure could be used as well to distinguish poor from 
rich households; these two alternatives are seen as balanced (IFS 2011, p. 365, or see Crossley et 
al., 2009 and Carrera, 2010). However, due to data availability only the income approach is used 
in this work. The effects on different household types are analysed. The HBS defines five 
different household types: Single households containing one adult under the age of 65, couple 
households in which the reference person is under the age of 65, couples with one or more 
children (children under the age of 18 and between 18 and 24, if still in education), pensioner 
single households above 65 and pensioner couple households in which the reference person is 
over the age of 65. 
Some of the methodological issues and their theoretical background are addressed in the 
following section. 
_____________________________________ 
Labour income 
+ Income from capital and properties 
_____________________________________!
= Primary income 
 
+ Social-security benefits and pensions 
+ Monetary transfers from other households 
_____________________________________ 
= Gross income 
 
− Mandatory transfer expenditure 
− Monetary transfers to other households 
_____________________________________ 
= Disposable income 
_____________________________________!
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3.4 Assumptions and Limitations 
Some assumptions made in order to conduct the analysis and the simulation, are elaborated below. 
Additionally the limitations of the methodology are discussed.  
3.4.1 Assumptions 
Tax shifting assumptions  
This study, as many other empirical papers (e.g. OECD, 2014a; IFS, 2011; Decoster et al., 2010; 
Leahy et al., 2011), assumes that the economic incidence of the tax lies on the consumer. While 
the statutory incidence is on the firms producing goods and services, tax shifting is assumed such 
that the consumer bears the tax burden in the end. However, as mentioned in section 2, due to 
many exemptions without pre-tax-deduction a hidden tax exists that cannot be directly passed on 
consumers. Estimations for Switzerland suggest that around 30% of total VAT revenue stems 
from this source (econonomiesuisse 2013, p. 8). Therefore, one has to be aware that taxes are not 
always shifted completely to the consumers. They might either be less or more than fully passed 
on (OECD/KIPF 2014, p. 28). One can assume that the tax is forwarded to consumers through 
higher prices. Hence consumers also pay a tax on goods that are exempted from the VAT. The 
amount of taxes paid by households is therefore probably underestimated. In contrast the opposite 
can be true for goods with high demand elasticity, like meals in a restaurant, and a vivid 
competition among the firms producing the good (ibid.).   
Behavioural responses 
When simulating the effect of a uniform tax rate, the simplifying assumption that households do 
not change their consumption pattern is made. Different arguments can be made for this 
assumption. First, talking about necessities, which are taxed with a reduced rate now and subject 
to a higher rate after a reform, households do not have a great choice to shift their consumption to 
lower taxed goods, since there are none. Also, demand elasticities of items such as food tend to be 
very low (Leahy et al. 2011, p. 218). Secondly, the reduction from the standard rate to a uniform 
tax rate will most likely not be very substantial. It is therefore plausible to assume that 
behavioural response stay within a small margin. Thirdly, one can argue that ignoring behavioural 
responses and being aware of the uncertainties of the results is favourable opposed to model the 
changes with many assumptions, which are hard to test for.  
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VAT exemptions 
Twenty-nine goods are either exempted from VAT or zero rated, that is, free from VAT and can 
hence obtain refunds for VAT paid on input goods. As previously mentioned, it is not clear 
whether or not producers of exempted goods shift the tax to the consumer. If tax shifting takes 
place, the consumer already bears a tax when consuming tax-exempt goods. Due to data 
limitations in this area, this paper follows the approach from the OECD study (OECD/KIPF 2014) 
and does not distinguish between zero rated and exempted goods in the analysis. This leads 
probably to an underestimation of the actual tax burden and the revenue. It could also lead to an 
underestimation of the regressivity or the progressivity of the tax system. The effect of the bias 
depends on the economic tax incidence of the hidden tax. Since there is no evidence on this, the 
issue unfortunately cannot be considered further. 
Consumer durables  
In the HBS all purchases are included, also the purchase of durables (FSO 2013a, p. 8). If the 
expenditures do not take place on a daily or weekly basis it is asked how frequently such 
purchases are made. Based upon this information, an optimal survey period is specified for 
different goods and the average monthly expenditure for infrequently purchased durables can be 
calculated (ibid. p. 7). This procedure ensures that durables are neither under- nor overestimated 
in the survey.  
3.4.2 Limitations 
Excise taxes 
The OECD study (OECD/KIPF 2014) also covers excise taxes imposed on alcohol, tobacco and 
transport fuels in order to assess the whole consumption tax burden. Excise taxes are often 
calculated ad valorem and or ad quantum, that means based on their value and or their quantity 
(OECD/KIPF 2014, p. 29). In Switzerland ad quantum taxes are levied on fuels, alcohol (spirits 
and beer, but not wine) and tobacco (SCA, 2015a). On tobacco also an ad-valorem tax is levied. 
While alcoholic beverages are additionally liable to VAT, fuels and tobacco products are not 
(ibid.). As the idea behind taxes on alcohol, tobacco and fuels is mainly to decrease their use with 
respect to negative externalities, these excise taxes are excluded from the analysis. This is without 
doubt a limitation when analysing the total tax burden for households. Nevertheless, as excise 
taxes are not affected by a change in the general VAT, it is reasonable from a policy perspective 
to exclude these taxes form the simulation.  
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Deadweight loss, administration and compliance costs 
The deadweight loss of a tax as well as the administration and compliance costs can justifiably be 
counted as a part of the tax burden (Warren 2008, p. 13). Nevertheless, due to the lack of data on 
these variables, this part of the tax burden is ignored when analysing the current situation. The tax 
burden is hence defined as the amount of VAT spent per household. An important assumption 
discussed above is that households do not alter their consumption patterns because of the tax 
reform. This implies that there is no additional deadweight loss caused by the reform and 
consequently the deadweight loss is ignored in the simulation as well. 
Taxes on non-residents and taxes by other countries on residents 
Analysing the value added tax burden of private households necessarily ignores taxes imposed on 
non-residents. At the same time taxes imposed on households by other countries, for instance 
through travelling and consumption abroad, cannot be modelled due to data constraints. However, 
as the aim of the paper is to analyse the VAT burden resulting from the Swiss system, this is a 
minor limitation.  
Changes in the transfer system 
When comparing the tax burden of the VAT for different income groups with respect to 
disposable income, the income tax system is already taken into account. This is favourable as one 
likes to look at the current situation with the income tax system in place. However, if major 
reforms have taken place, comparisons become flawed. In Switzerland, the greatest part of income 
taxation does not occur on a federal level. The cantons have fiscal sovereignty and consequently 
the tax rates differ substantially between the various cantons. Minor reforms like a change of the 
tax rate occur frequently and might influence the income distribution reflected in the HBS. 
Nevertheless, because of lacking regional data, possible effects from changes in the cantonal 
income taxation cannot be considered here.  
Mandatory transfer payments, like the health insurance premium, have been on the rise constantly 
during the last decade (FSO, 2015b). As the health insurance premium is the same across different 
income groups it does not impact the distribution of income and is therefore not of special 
concern. With regard to the social security contributions paid by employers and employees, the 
overall burden decreased from 12,6% to 12,5% in 2011. This 0,1% reduction was divided into a 
0,05% decrease for both the employee and the employer. The working population hence faced a 
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very slight reduction of their mandatory transfer payments in 2011 (FSIO, 2015). In the current 
setting, an evaluation of this change is not feasible.  
Data 
Some limitations stem from the data source used in this work.  
Accumulation of years 
Three years were cumulated into one survey period, from 2006 to 2008 and from 2009 to 2011, in 
order to obtain reliable estimates for household types, which have a low participation rate such as 
for instance pensioners. This is problematic when it comes to comparability. Prices might have 
changed during this three-year period due to inflation or other factors. In spite of that, no inflation 
adjustment takes place in the HBS. At the same time consumption patterns could have been 
adjusted during this time span exactly because of the change in prices and it is reasonable to argue 
that not all income groups adjusted their behaviour to the same extent. Looking at the changes in 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) between 2006 and 2008, some categories of goods have seen 
substantial price changes. In total the CPI was 3 points higher in 2008 than in 2006 (FSO, 2015a). 
In the second survey period considered here, 2009-2011, the changes are smaller, overall the CPI 
increased by 1 point between 2009 and 2011 (ibid.). Because the change in the CPI is attributed 
mainly to price increases in goods, which are not liable to VAT, like fuels and rentals, an inflation 
adjustment is not likely to improve the quality of the data. Therefore, no correction for inflation is 
performed.  
Another issue to be considered is that a change in the VAT rate was introduced the 1st of January 
2011. While this is unproblematic for the first wave, 2006-2008, it poses difficulties for the 
analysis of the data from 2009-2011. The effects of the reform cannot be assessed properly due to 
the accumulation of the data. However, as is not a main goal of the paper to assess changes over 
time, it will not be investigated further. For the analysis of the period 2009-2011 the old VAT 
rates are applied, first for simplicity and second because only one out of three years is affected by 
the higher VAT rates. We assume that households did not adjust their behaviour, as the changes in 
the rates were minor. Still, naturally this procedure will result in some inaccuracies.  
Aggregation of the data 
The data used in this paper is, as mentioned, aggregated data. This diminishes the scope of 
possibilities for analysis. Some studies (see IFS, 2011) argue that distinguishing between poor and 
rich by the distribution across expenditure has advantages in so far as expenditure seems to be a 
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better proxy for lifetime wealth than income (ibid. 373). The households are sorted across income 
distribution, based on gross income. Other studies sort the households across disposable income 
distribution. Due to the aggregation level of the data it is not possible to use and evaluate the 
different approaches in the analysis.  
Another limitation arising from the aggregation of the data is that one cannot perform a household 
equalisation, which is usually done to adjust the income of households with different 
compositions in order to achieve comparability. The so-called equivalence scales assign different 
weights to the household members, based on characteristics such as for instance age (Anyaegbu 
2010, p. 50). If no equalisation takes place, households with varying characteristics are compared. 
To illustrate, there might be many single households in the lowest income category while there are 
probably more families, that is, couples with at least one child, in the higher income groups. This 
should be kept in mind when looking at the overall picture. The problem fortunately becomes 
significantly smaller in the analysis of different household types; there the composition of the 
household is already taken into account.  
The results of the analysis are presented in the subsequent section.  
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4 Results 
This chapter presents the results from the calculations of the VAT burden of households in 
different income groups as well as the results from the simulation and its effects with respect to 
distributional aspects.  
4.1 Value Added Tax Burden 
In the first survey period, 2006-2008, the average tax burden per household was 217,7 Swiss 
Francs per month. In the second period, 2009-2011, this value amounted CHF 222. Based on 
these numbers, the total revenue from private households per year was calculated and compared to 
the actual VAT revenue according to official statistics. The calculated amount is lower than actual 
VAT revenue for two reasons. First, VAT paid by companies that sell goods exempt from the tax 
and thus cannot credit the VAT paid on input goods is not included and might make up to 30% of 
total tax revenue (economiesuisse 2013, p. 8). Second, household surveys tend to underreport 
consumption when compared to national accounts (IFS 2011, p. 367). In Table 3 below the actual 
VAT revenue is compared to the calculations performed.  
Table 3: Revenue under the existing tax structure 
 Estimated VAT revenue Official Statistics 
 CHF in billions % of actual VAT CHF in billions 
2006-2008 8,485 42,99 19,738 
2009-2011 9,296 44,77 20,764 
Note: For the official values, the average from the three respective years was taken. Source: Author’s 
elaboration, official statistics according to FTA (2015a). 
The study by IFS (2011) calculates the revenue ratios for European Union countries and finds 
numbers that account for in between 44% of total VAT revenue in Germany and 97% in Greece 
(2011, p. 368). The numbers obtained here, approximately 43% and 45%, hence can be assigned 
to the lower range of estimations. 
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4.1.1 Tax Burden: With Respect to Income 
The average VAT burden per household measured with respect to disposable income is 3,67% for 
the period 2006-2008 and 3,52% for the period 2009-2011. Measuring the average tax burden 
across the income distribution as a share of disposable income the VAT is slightly regressive. In 
both survey periods the first quintile has the highest share of VAT and this share is falling when 
moving across the distribution. The better off the households are the smaller is the share of their 
income they pay in VAT. Comparing the two survey periods a decline in the tax burden can be 
noticed. This decline is present for all income groups except the second quintile, where the burden 
remains unchanged.  
Table 4: VAT burden across the income distribution (% of disposable income) 
Income Quintile Group 
Average VAT burden per household 
(% of disposable income) 
2006-2008 2009-2011 
Poorest 4,62 4,38 
2 3,72 3,72 
3 3,59 3,38 
4 3,33 3,21 
Richest 3,08 2,93 
Source: Author’s calculations based on HBS (FSO, 2014). 
This result is displayed in the figure below, where one observes the regressive pattern and the 
small decline from the first to the second survey period. It is further notable that the burden from 
the valued added tax is small in general, with a share of VAT spending approximately between 3 
and 5 % of disposable income. 
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Figure 3: Average VAT payment per HH (% of disposable income) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on HBS (FSO, 2014). 
4.1.2 Tax Burden: With Respect to Expenditure 
The average overall tax burden with respect to total expenditure is 3,65% in the first survey 
period, 2006-2008, and 3,63% in the second period from 2009-2011. Thus it is higher than when 
measured with respect to disposable income. The decline in the overall tax burden, which was 
observed before, is much smaller when measuring the tax burden with respect to expenditure. 
While the two different measurement concepts lead to a tax burden that is almost equal in the first 
survey period, the shares differ more for the second period.  
When assessing the tax burden with respect to expenditure across the income distribution, the 
regressive pattern disappears. The VAT is slightly progressive when evaluated from a lifetime 
income perspective. The decrease in the tax ratio between the first and second survey period, 
which could be observed with respect to income, becomes smaller and is not present throughout 
all income groups anymore. For the second as well as the forth quintile the tax burden rose by 
0.01 and 0.02 percentage points, respectively. A small decrease is observed for the other income 
groups.  
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Table 5: VAT burden across the income distribution (% of expenditure) 
Income Quintile Group 
Average VAT burden per household 
(% of expenditure) 
2006-2008 2009-2011 
Poorest 3,34 3,31 
2 3,52 3,53 
3 3,67 3,63 
4 3,76 3,78 
Richest 3,96 3,91 
Source: Author’s calculations based on HBS (FSO 2014). 
The differences between the income groups are very small in both survey periods. Measuring the 
tax burden with respect to income led to an decrease of 1,54 percentage points from the first to the 
fifth quintile for the first survey period, while here, taking expenditure as a base, we observe an 
increase of 0,62 percentage points. For the second survey period the decrease is 1,45 percentage 
points when adopting an income base, compared to a 0,6 percentage point increase when looking 
at the tax burden as a share of total expenditure. The regressivity that can be seen with income as 
a measurement base is thus stronger than the progressivity observed with expenditure as a base. 
In the figure below it becomes visible that the differences between the survey periods are minor.  
Figure 4: Average VAT payment per HH (% of expenditure) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on HBS (FSO 2014).  
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It has to be kept in mind that the above-presented results are averages over a quintile, and thus 
might not reflect the effect on all groups within a quintile. It also has to be acknowledged that an 
equalisation of households (according to the number and characteristics of household members) 
could not be performed with the publicly available data. The results for different household types 
are shown in the next section. 
4.1.3 Tax Burden: Different Household Types 
More insights into the distributional patterns can be gained by analysing the effects for different 
household types.  
With respect to disposable income 
In the first survey period the pattern of the tax burden is generally regressive when analysed as a 
share of disposable income. However, in at least one of the survey periods for all household types 
the third quintile has a lower share of VAT spending than the fourth. The difference is nonetheless 
minor. Single households in the first quintile have clearly the highest share of VAT spending with 
respect to their disposable income in 2006-2008. Surprisingly this share drops substantially in the 
second survey period (-1,29 percentage points). Single households still pay the greatest burden in 
2009-2011, closely followed by pensioner couples. In contrast, on average it is couples with 
children that pay the highest VAT burden in the first survey period. Pensioner couples have on 
average the most considerable tax burden in the second survey period. 
Generally the tax burden ratios drop for three groups from the first to the second period; Single 
households, couples and couples with children pay a smaller share, while single pensioners and 
pensioner couples pay more. The slight decrease when looking at the main picture (see Table 4) 
can therefore be attributed to the working households and hence probably to rising incomes.  
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Table 6: VAT burden across income distribution and household type (% of disposable income).  
Income 
Quintile 
Group 
Average VAT burden per household (% of disposable income) 
Single 
Household <65 
Couple <65 
Couple with 
Children 
Pensioner >65 
Pensioner Couple 
>65 
2006-
2008 
2009-
2011 
2006-
2008 
2009-
2011 
2006-
2008 
2009-
2011 
2006-
2008 
2009-
2011 
2006-
2008 
2009-
2011 
Poorest 5,22 3,93 4,15 3,86 4,01 3,59 3,33 3,44 3,56 3,92 
2 3,48 3,08 3,51 3,32 3,62 3,28 3,08 3,06 3,36 3,66 
3 2,97 3,01 3,23 3,05 3,39 3,22 2,73 2,59 2,98 3,33 
4 2,98 2,80 3,16 3,06 3,42 3,20 2,64 2,84 3,27 3,30 
Richest 2,72 2,54 2,91 2,81 3,22 2,97 2,37 2,84 2,77 2,87 
Source: Author’s calculations based on HBS (FSO, 2014). 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 below illustrate the distributional effects for different household types. The 
spike that is observed for single households in the first quintile during the survey period 2006-
2008 disappears in the second period. Moreover one can see how the distribution of the VAT 
burden changed. Pensioner couples for instance face a lower burden compared to other types of 
households in 2006-2008, however, in 2009-2011 they bear the highest burden. 
Figure 5: VAT burden for different household types (% of disposable income), 2006-2008 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on HBS (FSO, 2014). 
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Figure 6: VAT burden for different household types (% of disposable income), 2009-2011 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on HBS (FSO, 2014). 
It is worth noting that the differences between the income groups on the whole are very small. 
This is in contrast to the results for many OECD countries, where large differences up to 15 
percentage points between the richest and the poorest group exist (IFS 2011, p. 370). A reason for 
this result might be the low value added tax rates in Switzerland. In comparison with other OECD 
countries, Switzerland has the third lowest standard rate. Only Japan and Canada have with 5% a 
lower rate. The average standard rate for OECD countries was 18,5% in 2011 (OECD 2014, p. 
60). Looking at the VAT spending of households, according to a report prepared for the European 
Commission, the average EU-27 household spends 11% of its expenditure in VAT (IHS 2013, p. 
17). The VAT burden is Switzerland, as calculated here, is lower and does not vary substantially 
for different types of households.  
With respect to expenditure 
As before, when the measurement base is changed to expenditure, the tax burden ratios are 
somewhat progressive (Table 7). High-income households pay a higher share of their expenditure 
in VAT than low-income households. Couples without children pay on average the highest share 
of their expenditure in VAT, the number is lowest for single household pensioners. Again the 
numbers are very close to each other. A minor decline in the tax burden from the first to the 
second survey period is observed. The households that belong to the working population face 
lower tax burdens while the share is on average almost unchanged for pensioners and pensioner 
couples.  
0	  
1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  
Poorest	   2	   3	   4	   Richest	  
Single	  Household	  <65	  Couple	  <65	  Couple	  with	  Children	  Pensioner	  >65	  Pensioner	  Couple	  >65	  
  33 
Table 7: VAT burden across income distribution and household type (% of expenditure) 
Income 
Quintile 
Group 
Average VAT burden per household (% of expenditure) 
Single 
Household <65 
Couple <65 
Couple with 
Children 
Pensioner >65 
Pensioner Couple 
>65 
2006-
2008 
2009-
2011 
2006-
2008 
2009-
2011 
2006-
2008 
2009-
2011 
2006-
2008 
2009-
2011 
2006-
2008 
2009-
2011 
Poorest 3,16 2,96 3,34 3,06 3,35 3,28 2,39 2,21 2,51 2,57 
2 3,15 3,12 3,63 3,59 3,62 3,47 2,40 2,59 2,77 2,85 
3 3,14 3,22 3,73 3,67 3,65 3,60 2,52 2,43 2,87 3,11 
4 3,37 3,28 3,86 3,83 3,78 3,72 2,57 2,74 3,14 3,10 
Richest 3,31 3,33 4,02 3,95 3,86 3,74 2,65 2,79 3,19 3,22 
Source: Author’s calculations based on HBS (FSO, 2014). 
The figures are displayed to illustrate the differences in tax burdens with respect to expenditure 
for the five types of households. The existing patterns only show small changes from the first to 
the second survey period. For instance, the tax burden single households face becomes more 
progressive and couples with children pay more compared to couples without children in the 
period 2009-2011. 
Figure 7: VAT burden for different household types (% of expenditure), 2006-2008 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on HBS (FSO, 2014). 
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Figure 8: VAT burden for different household types (% of expenditure), 2009-2011 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on HBS (FSO, 2014). 
A reason why the picture is progressive when the tax burden in respect to expenditure is 
considered might be the reduced rates on necessities such as food and medication. Low-income 
households tend to spend a greater proportion of their consumption expenditure on these items 
and as they are taxed with a lower rate, their corresponding VAT payment is lower. Why this 
pattern cannot be seen in the income approach is likely due to borrowing and savings behaviour: 
From the HBS it becomes clear that all household types in the lowest quintile have expenditures 
that are higher than their disposable income (see Appendix C). This is true for both survey periods 
and indicates that people fund consumption by either drawing down savings or borrowing money. 
It implies that at some point during their life they will need to spend less in order to pay back 
loans and hence then they will incur lower VAT with respect to their income. On the other hand, 
the working households in quintiles 3 to 5 spend less than their disposable income. These 
households save and their savings will be liable to VAT later on, for example after being retired, 
driving up the tax burden with respect to income for pensioners. The tax burden with respect to 
income depends on the saving and borrowing pattern. On these grounds it can be argued that the 
expenditure based approach pictures lifetime income and hence the overall distributional effects 
of the VAT better (see also IFS 2011, pp. 372ff).  
In the following section the effect of a tax reform on the distribution of the tax burden is analysed. 
0	  
1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  
Poorest	   2	   3	   4	   Richest	  
Single	  Household	  <65	  Couple	  <65	  Couple	  with	  Children	  	  Pensioner	  >65	  Pensioner	  Couple	  >65	  
  35 
4.2 Simulation: Uniform VAT Rate 
The first part of the simulation is to determine the rate needed in order to generate the same 
amount of revenue as before. This is straightforward when it comes to all the goods that are taxed 
at a reduced rate at the moment, however rather difficult concerning all the exemptions present in 
the system. Abolishing all the exemptions is not realistic, as some exemptions are due to the 
difficulty to tax certain goods and are also present in countries with a broad tax base and a 
uniform rate like New Zealand (OECD/KIPF, 2014). Such goods and services include financial 
services, insurances as well as gambling and the lottery (Swiss Federal Council 2008, p. 7048).  
The reform considered here includes the introduction of a uniform rate on all goods that are 
currently taxed with one of the three rates. Additionally most of the exemptions are abolished. In 
this I follow the propositions already made by the Swiss government in 2008 and evaluate the 
abolishment of 20 out of 29 exemptions. The exemptions for goods and services, which are 
difficult to tax, are kept. The renting of property, which was exempted before, will still be 
exempted and the same holds for production in agriculture and education (Swiss Federal Council 
2008, p. 7045-7049). Goods, which are currently not liable to VAT because they are taxed with 
different excise taxes, such as cigarettes and fuels will still be exempted as well. A table with the 
goods and their respective post-reform tax rate can be found in Appendix B (Table 12).  
Based on this reform proposal it is calculated how high a uniform rate would have to be in order 
to generate the same amount of tax revenue as before. For this purpose the revenue generated by 
household consumption as surveyed in the Household Budget Survey is calculated and then the 
new rate structure is applied to the expenditure. The number of households is taken from the 
Federal Statistical Office (FSO, 2008 and 2013b). A revenue-neutral rate of 5,70% is calculated 
based on the expenditure in the survey period 2006-2008 and a rate of 5,64% for the period 2009-
2011. This result shows that the composition of the VAT burden changed from the first to the 
second survey period.  
Compared to the budget-neutral proposition of 6% made by the Swiss government the obtained 
rates are slightly lower (Swiss Federal Council, 2008). As previously described, the estimated tax 
revenue based on private consumption accounts for roughly 45% of the official tax revenue. A 
substantial amount of funds today is raised through hidden taxes, which are supposed to decrease 
with the elimination of tax exemptions. This implies that a rate of around 5,7% probably would 
not be revenue neutral but result in a decline in tax revenue. It is thus more realistic to simulate 
the flat rate with a rate of 6%. This number proposed by the Federal Council is based on their own 
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estimations, however unfortunately their report does not describe how the number was obtained 
precisely. We assume that the distributional consequences of a reform can be pictured more 
reasonable using this rate. Based on the HBS, the newly calculated tax revenue with a VAT rate 
of 6% would account for 48% of the official revenue. For the simulation the latest available 
dataset from the period 2009-2011 is taken.   
4.2.1 Simulation Results: With Respect to Income and Expenditure 
In the table below the general results for tax burdens are displayed, both as a share of disposable 
income as well as a share of total expenditure. The pattern of the tax burden ratios is very similar 
to the analysis of the current situation with reduced rates. From a lifetime income perspective the 
tax reform results in a slightly progressive VAT. As a share of disposable income the flat rate is 
regressive to some extent, as it is the case with the actual system. The tax burden is higher than 
before, but the change is minor. The tax base is much broader compared to the pre-reform 
situation and because there are no reduced rates, the standard rate is lower. Therefore the overall 
tax burden does not rise substantially. The reform is regressive regardless of the measure applied. 
The percentage point changes that are displayed in parentheses illustrate that the tax burden 
increases proportionally more for low-income households. 
Table 8: Simulated VAT burden across the income distribution 
Income Quintile 
Group 
Average VAT burden per household: Simulation with a flat rate of 6% 
% of disposable income % of expenditure 
Poorest 4,96 (+0,58) 3,76 (+0,45) 
2 4,05 (+0,33) 3,84 (+0,31) 
3 3,64 (+0,26) 3,91 (+0,28) 
4 3,40 (+0,19) 4,01 (+0,23) 
Richest 3,02 (+0,09) 4,03 (+0,12) 
Note: Percentage point change compared to the pre-reform situation 2009-2011 in parentheses. Source: Author’s 
calculations based on HBS 2009-2011 (FSO, 2014). 
In the graph below it can be observed that the VAT is still slightly progressive as a share of 
expenditure and still regressive with respect to disposable income. 
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Figure 9: Simulated average VAT payment per HH 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on HBS 2009-2011 (FSO 2014). 
The average tax burden with respect to disposable income is 3,51% after the reform compared to 
3,29% before. The burden as a proportion of expenditure increased from 3,71% to 3,95%.  
In the next section the impact on different household types is considered.  
4.2.2 Simulation Results: Different Household Types 
The simulated tax burdens are presented first as a proportion of disposable income and second as 
a proportion of total expenditure. 
With respect to disposable income 
One can see in Table 9 that the VAT measured as a share of disposable income is regressive for 
all household types. It is highest for pensioner couples in the first quintile and lowest for single 
households in the fifth quintile. The changes in the tax burden, compared to the situation in the 
survey period 2009-2011, are small. Nevertheless, the reform is regressive with greater tax 
increases for the less well-off households. This is true for all household types. Pensioners and 
pensioner couples face the greatest increase with on average roughly 1 percentage point. Couples 
without children encounter the smallest rise in their tax burden.  
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Table 9: Simulated VAT burden across income distribution and household type (% of disposable 
income) 
Income Quintile 
Group 
Average VAT burden per household (% of disposable income) 
Single 
Household <65 
Couple <65 
Couple with 
children 
Pensioner >65 
Pensioner 
Couple >65 
Poorest 4,65 (+0,72) 4,48 (+0,62) 4,14 (+0,55) 5,03 (+1,59) 5,44 (+1,52) 
2 3,40 (+0,32) 3,58 (+0,26) 3,68 (+0,4) 4,12 (+1,06) 4,76 (+1,1) 
3 3,25 (+0,24) 3,21 (+0,16) 3,57 (+0,35) 3,52 (+0,93) 4,18 (+0,85) 
4 3,00 (+0,2) 3,15 (+0,09) 3,51 (+0,31) 3,58 (+0,74) 4,10 (+0,8) 
Richest 2,64 (+0,1) 2,82 (+0,01) 3,19 (+0,22) 3,61 (+0,77) 3,39 (+0,52) 
Note: Percentage point change compared to the pre-reform situation 2009-2011 in parentheses. Source: Author’s 
calculations based on HBS 2009-2011 (FSO 2014). 
Figure 10 depicted below illustrates the tax burdens for different household types with a uniform 
VAT of 6%, measured with respect to disposable income. Compared to the current situation 
(Figure 6) the tax is more regressive. The difference between the first and the fifth quintile is more 
pronounced after the reform. 
Figure 10: Simulated VAT burden for different household types (% of disposable income) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on HBS 2009-2011 (FSO, 2014). 
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With respect to expenditure 
Considering the tax burden with respect to expenditure in Table 10, the VAT is considered 
marginally progressive for all household types except single households where it is roughly 
proportional. Generally the changes from one income group to another are very minor, only for 
pensioners in the lowest quintile the increase is 1 percentage point or higher. Like before, 
pensioner and pensioner couples see on average the greatest increase in VAT burden while 
couples without children face the smallest increase. Yet, the changes are smaller than in the 
analysis with respect to disposable income. 
While the changes seem minor it is worth noting that the reform has a regressive effect. The 
increase in tax burden is thus greater for low-income households than it is for high-income 
households and this holds for all household types.  
Table 10: Simulated VAT burden across income distribution and household type (% of expenditure) 
Income Quintile 
Group 
Average VAT burden per household (% of expenditure) 
Single 
Household <65 
Couple <65 
Couple with 
children 
Pensioner >65 
Pensioner 
Couple >65 
Poorest 3,49 (+0,53) 3,55 (+0,49) 3,79 (+0,51) 3,24 (+1,03) 3,58 (+1,01) 
2 3,45 (+0,33) 3,87 (+0,28) 3,89 (+0,42) 3,49 (+0,9) 3,71 (+0,86) 
3 3,48 (+0,26) 3,86 (+0,19) 4,00 (+0,4) 3,29 (+0,86) 3,90 (+0,79) 
4 3,52 (+0,24) 3,94 (+0,11) 4,09 (+0,37) 3,46 (+0,72) 3,85 (+0,75) 
Richest 3,46 (+0,13) 3,96 (+0,01) 4,03 (+0,29) 3,58 (+0,79) 3,80 (+0,58) 
Note: Percentage point change compared to the pre-reform situation 2009-2011 in parentheses. Source: Author’s 
calculations based on HBS 2009-2011 (FSO 2014). 
Figure 11 illustrates the distribution of the VAT burden after the reform. In comparison with the 
pre-reform situation (Figure 8), the slight progressive effect of the tax diminishes and the VAT 
seems to be roughly proportional after implementing a uniform consumption tax rate.   
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Figure 11: Simulated VAT burden for different household types (% of expenditure) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on HBS 2009-2011 (FSO, 2014). 
It is assumed, as explained in section 3.4.1, that households do not change their spending 
behaviour, that is, they spend the same amount of money for the same goods as they did before. 
The results should be treated as approximations since this is an abstraction from reality.  
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5 Discussion 
The results described in the previous chapter will now be evaluated and compared with existing 
research in this area.  
How does the value added tax affect the income distribution in Switzerland? The results obtained 
show, as in other studies (for example OECD (2014a), IFS (2011) O’Donoghue et al. (2004), 
Decoster et al. (2010)), that the discussion depends crucially on the measurement base adopted for 
assessing the distributional impact. Whether one looks at the tax burden in relation to total 
expenditure or disposable income changes the picture thoroughly. The current system of VAT in 
Switzerland with three different rates and many exempted goods is slightly regressive with respect 
to disposable income, when sorted across the income distribution. However, the system is to some 
extent progressive when defining the tax burden as the share of total expenditure. So far in 
literature there is no clear consensus on which measurement is favourable. Due to saving and 
borrowing patterns that become obvious in the Household Budget Survey, the expenditure-based 
approach is preferred in this context. Hence the impression that the current consumption tax 
system hurts the poor proportionally more than the rich is not founded.  
The VAT burden is also relatively evenly spread over different household types. Couples tend to 
pay on average the highest share while it is lowest for pensioners, but the difference is only 0,71 
percentage points in the first survey period and 0,69 percentage points in the second period. It can 
be observed that the VAT burden generally decreases from the first to the second survey period. 
The decrease in the VAT burden with respect to disposable income can be attributed to the fact 
that total expenditure constitutes a smaller share of disposable income in the period 2009-2011 
than in 2006-2008. However, why the VAT burden with respect to total expenditure declined, is 
unclear. Changes in consumption patterns might have happened in the wake of the economic 
downturn after the financial crisis. 
Simulating a tax reform with a flat VAT of 6% and the elimination of many exemptions (20 of 
29) yields two main results. Firstly, the post-reform tax system is still marginally progressive 
when evaluated with the expenditure-based approach and secondly, the reform is regressive, 
increasing the tax burden proportionally more for the low-income than for the high-income 
households. An explanation is that low-income households spend a greater amount of their total 
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expenditure on goods that are either taxed with a reduced rate, or exempted from VAT. 
Households in the first quintile spend 24,3% of total expenditure on reduced rated or exempted 
goods (which are taxed after the reform), whereas this share is 19,5% for the fifth quintile.  
The regressive effect is not very strong, however it should still be considered in the design of a 
reform. A tax reform is more likely to pass parliament if the level of distribution is not affected 
(see Linder, 2012).  
With respect to the simulation of a tax reform, one should also discuss the behavioural 
assumptions made. Assuming that individuals do not change their consumption behaviour after a 
tax change might be realistic in the case of food, where the change in the tax rate is minor with an 
increase of 4 percentage points and where we look at a good considered a necessity. However 
there might be a strong reaction for goods that are now exempt from taxes and will be taxed with 
6% afterwards. On the other hand the effect might not be as substantial because in the sectors 
currently exempted from tax like for instance in the health sector or in social services, there is a 
relevant amount of hidden tax collected, which probably already influences the prices. This 
implies that the newly introduced VAT would not be fully passed through to consumers. While 
this aspect is not modelled in other studies either, the behavioural aspects are incorporated 
through micro simulation models in some papers (see OECD/KIPF, 2014). An application of a 
micro simulation model however lies outside the scope of this paper.  
The theory of optimal taxation describes and discusses the trade-off between equity and efficiency 
thoroughly (see Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980). Efficiency refers to taxation with minimised 
deadweight losses. When it comes to consumption taxes, differentiated rates seem favourable if a 
distinction between goods consumed by different income groups can be made and if the tax does 
not distort decisions (ibid.). Often this is not possible, because different income groups consume 
the same type of goods and if there are varying preferences for certain goods, the administrative 
costs for taxing these goods differently are very high. In Switzerland, the difference in 
expenditure shares on goods with reduced rates or exemptions is only 4,8 percentage points 
between the first and the fifth quintile. These goods do hence not provide a good distinction 
between consumption patterns of different income groups. The mechanical revenue loss is 
substantial, especially when put into relation to the redistributive effect (Swiss Federal Council, 
2010). Pursuing an equity goal with reduced consumption tax rates seems hence not very efficient. 
Especially if the government has other possibilities of taxation through which a desired level of 
progressivity can be achieved, as it is the case with the personal income tax. On these grounds the 
simulated reform seems to be reasonable, especially if the poor households could be compensated, 
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which was originally planned in the reform (Swiss Federal Council, 2008). Such a reform would 
probably lead to a significant decrease in compliance and administrative costs (FDF 2008, p. 
7074). According to a study commissioned by the Federal Department of Finance firms would 
save 22% in compliance costs with a uniform VAT rate. Additionally substantial cost savings 
could be made by the tax administration (ibid.). The money saved in this way could be used to 
compensate households losing the most.  
When using the estimated tax rate, that is 5,7%, instead of the 6% that has been proposed by the 
Federal Council, the distributional impact of the reform itself is more regressive. The reason is 
that the highest income groups benefit more from the decline in the standard rate than the low-
income groups as they consume more normally taxed goods. The fifth quintile spends 46,2% of 
total expenditure on normally taxed goods, whereas this share is only 37,3% for the first quintile. 
With a rate of 5,7% everyone pays less than with a 6% rate, while this tax burden relief is more 
pronounced for the high-income households. If one prefers to keep the level of redistribution 
constant, the higher rate of 6% is favourable. Additionally a compensation scheme is more likely 
to be feasible with a higher rate and the reform could then be implemented distributionally 
neutral.  
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6 Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the discussion about the value added tax in Switzerland by investigating 
the distribution of the tax burden. In order to make a reform of a very complicated system 
feasible, detailed information about the actual situation, especially with regard to the distributional 
aspects of the system, is needed. An OECD report (2014) about the distributional effects of the 
value added tax gives valuable information about the situation in twenty OECD countries. 
Switzerland is not part of the sample. In order to close this research gap, a very similar approach 
has been adopted in this study.   
The paper shows the distributional aspects of the VAT in Switzerland and investigates the impact 
of a reform, which simplifies the tax system by eliminating tax exemptions and introducing a 
uniform rate. The current system is slightly progressive when analysed from a lifetime income 
perspective and would still be somewhat progressive or roughly proportional after the tax reform. 
The reform is regressive, hitting the low-income households proportionally harder than the high-
income households. However, the effect is small. Therefore, the reform would still be desirable 
from a perspective of efficiency, especially if the reform is accompanied by a compensation 
scheme. Substantial gains are expected due to lower administrative and compliance costs. 
The limitations regarding the aggregate data available and the modelling should be considered 
when interpreting the results. Especially the simulation results can be seen as indications rather 
than facts. Further research could take into account behavioural responses and assess the price 
effects that will occur in sectors that are currently exempted and where a substantial amount of 
hidden tax is collected. This will require micro simulation models, such as EUROMOD, and also 
a considerable amount of assumptions will be needed. Micro simulation models also allow to 
model reforms with a compensating scheme in order to keep the level of redistribution constant.  
Furthermore it will be important to research more in depth the question of lifetime income and 
whether expenditure is the optimal proxy. The redistribution of income is a highly political topic 
and therefore a consensus among researchers regarding the measurement issue would be 
favourable for decision-making in policy.  
  
  45 
7 References 
Amrein, M. (2014). Das Ei des Kolumbus ist unerwünscht, in: NZZ 2014-08-23, available online: 
http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/das-ei-des-kolumbus-ist-unerwuenscht-1.18368659 [accessed 
2015-04-23] 
Anyaegbu, G. (2010). Using the OECD Equivalence Scale in Taxes and Benefits Analysis, 
Economic and Labour Market Review, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 49 – 54 
Atkinson, A.B. & Stiglitz, J.E. (1980). Lectures on Public Economics, London: McGraw-Hill  
Atkinson, A.B. & Stiglitz, J.E. (1972). The Structure of Indirect Taxation and Economic 
Efficiency, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 1, issue 1, pp. 97-119 
Bodin, J-P., Ebrill, L.P., Keen, M. & Summers V.P. (2001). The Modern VAT, Washington D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund 
Bodmer, F. (2007). Die volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der MwSt und einiger 
Reformszenarien, Gutachten im Auftrag der Eidgenössischen Steuerverwaltung, Bern: 
Federal Department of Finance 
Bosch, L.H.M. & van den Noord, P.J. (1990). Alternative Financing of Social Insurance Systems, 
Journal of Policy Modeling, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 61-76 
Carrera, S. (2010). An Expenditure-Based Analysis of the Redistribution of Household Income, 
Economic and Labour Market Review, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 18-27 
Copenhagen Economics (2007). Study on Reduced VAT Applied to Goods and Services in the 
Member States of the European Union, Final Report DG TAXUD 
Crawford, I., Keen, M. & Smith, S. (2010). Value Added Tax and Excises, in ibid., The Mirrless 
Review, Dimensions of Tax Design, pp. 275-422 
Crossley, T., Phillips, D. & Wakefield, M. (2009). Value Added Tax, Chapter 10, in ibid., Green 
Budget 2009, Institute for Fiscal Studies, available online: 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2009/09chap10.pdf [accessed 2015-05-06] 
Deaton, A. (2005). Franco Modigliani and the Life Cycle Theory of Consumption, Presented at 
the Convegno Internazionale Franco Modgliani, available online: 
https://www.princeton.edu/~deaton/downloads/romelecture.pdf [accessed 2015-05-20] 
Decoster, A., Loughrey, J., O’Donoghue, C. & Verwerft, D. (2010). How Regressive Are Indirect 
Taxes? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 326-350 
  46 
Economiesuisse (2013). Mehrwertsteuer: Einheitssatz bleibt beste Lösung, dossierpolitik, no. 5 
Federal Act on Value Added Tax (VAT Act) (2009). Bern, available online: 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20081110/index.html [accessed 2015-04-
04] 
Federal Department of Finance (FDF) (2015). Die Steuern von Bund, Kantonen und Gemeinden, 
Bern: Federal Tax Administration 
Federal Department of Finance (FDF) (2010). Weitere Varianten zur nachhaltigen Verbesserung 
der Mehrwertsteuer: Bericht des Bundesrates zur Botschaft zur Vereinfachung der 
Mehrwertsteuer (08.053), Bern: Federal Department of Finance 
Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO) (2015). Praxis – Beiträge an die AHV, die IV, die EO und 
die ALV, available online: http://www.bsv.admin.ch/praxis/02504/index.html?lang=de 
[accessed 2015-05-07] 
Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2015a). Landesindex der Konsumentenpreise – Detaillierte 
Daten – LIK (Dezember 2010=100), Detailresultate, Indexstand und Warenkorbstruktur 2010 
[LIK10B10], available online: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/05/02/blank/data.html  [accessed 2015-
04-28] 
Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2015b). Krankenversicherungsprämien. Veränderungsraten zum 
Vorjahr, KVPI, available online: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/05/03/blank/key/index.html [accessed 
2015-05-15] 
Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2014). Surveys, Sources: Household Budget Survey, available 
online: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/infothek/erhebungen__quellen/blank/blank/habe/
01.html [accessed 2015-04-23] 
Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2013a). Haushaltsbudgeterhebung 2011. Kommentierte 
Ergebnisse und Tabellen, Neuchâtel: FSO 
Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2013b). Bevölkerung – Privathaushalte nach Haushaltstyp, 
available online: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/01/new.html 
[accessed 2015-05-11] 
Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2008). Haushaltsszenarien: Entwicklung der Privathaushalte 
zwischen 2005 und 2030, Neuchâtel: Federal Statistical Office 
Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (2007). Die Einkommens- und Verbrauchserhebung mit neuer 
Methode. Neues Gewichtungsmodell, Resultate 2000–2003 und Studie zur Altersvorsorge, 
Neuchâtel: Federal Statistical Office 
  47 
Federal Tax Administration (FTA) (2015a). Steuerstatistiken: Mehrwertsteuer, available online: 
http://www.estv.admin.ch/dokumentation/00075/00076/00714/index.html?lang=de [accessed 
2015-04-22] 
Federal Tax Administration (FTA) (2015b). Steuerpflicht, allgemeine Informationen, available 
online: http://www.estv.admin.ch/mwst/themen/00154/00589/index.html?lang=de [accessed 
2015-04-26] 
Federal Tax Administration (FTA) (2015c). Steuerstatistiken: Fiskaleinnahmen des Bundes, 
available online: 
http://www.estv.admin.ch/dokumentation/00075/00076/00698/01736/index.html?lang=de 
[accessed 2015-05-22] 
Federal Tax Administration (FTA) (2015d). Value Added Tax, available online: 
http://www.estv.admin.ch/mwst/themen/00153/index.html?lang=en [accessed 2015-05-25] 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) (2011). Quantitative Analysis of VAT Rate Structures, in IFS et 
al., A Retrospective Evaluation of Elements of the EU VAT System, Final Report 
TAXUD/2010/DE/328, pp. 361-533 
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) (2013). A Study on the Economic Effects of the Current 
VAT Rates Structure, Report prepared for the European Commission, in consortium with 
CAPP, CASE, CEPII, ETLA, IFO and IFS 
 
Keschnigg, C. (2010). Die ideale Mehrwertsteuer, available online: 
http://www.oekonomenstimme.org/artikel/2010/07/die-ideale-mehrwertsteuer/ [accessed 2015-
04-21] 
Lamprecht, M., Fischer, A. & Stamm, H.P. (2011). Sportvereine in der Schweiz, Magglingen:  
Bundesamt für Sport 
Linder, W. (2012). Schweizerische Demokratie: Institutionen - Prozesse – Perspektiven, 3rd 
edition, Bern: Haupt  
O’Donoghue, C., Baldini, M. & Mantovani, D. (2004). Modelling the Redistributive Impact of 
Indirect Taxes in Europe: An Application of EUROMOD, EUROMOD Working Papers, no. 
EM7/01 
OECD/Korea Institute of Public Finance (KIPF) (2014). The Distributional Effects of 
Consumption Taxes in OECD Countries, OECD Tax Policy Studies, no. 22, OECD Publishing, 
available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264224520-en [accessed 2015-04-04] 
OECD (2014). Consumption Tax Trends 2014, OECD Publishing, available online: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ctt-2014-en [accessed 2015-04-05] 
OECD (2014b). Tax Policy Analysis: Revenue Rate Structure: Revenue Statistics 2014, available 
online: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/revenue-statistics-tax-structures.htm [accessed 
2015-05-22] 
  48 
Sandmo, A. (1976). Optimal Taxation. An Introduction to the Literature, Journal of Public 
Economics, vol. 6, pp. 37-54 
Schaltegger, C.A., Daepp, M. & Jeitziner, B. (2005). Grundlegende Steuerreformen für die 
Schweiz: Ein Überblick, Die Volkswirtschaft, vol. 5, pp. 7-10 
Swiss Customs Administration (SCA) (2015a). Taxes and Duties: Importation into Switzerland, 
available online: http://www.ezv.admin.ch/zollinfo_firmen/04020/04256/index.html?lang=en 
[accessed 2015-04-28] 
Swiss Customs Administration (SCA) (2015b). Taxes and Fees, available online: 
http://www.ezv.admin.ch/themen/04098/index.html?lang=en [accessed 2015-04-24] 
Swiss Federal Council (2010). Zusatzbotschaft zur Botschaft zur Vereinfachung der 
Mehrwertsteuer (Förderung der Wirtschaft und des Wachstums), Botschaft 08.053, Bern 
Swiss Federal Council (2008). Botschaft zur Vereinfachung der Mehrwertsteuer, Botschaft 
08.053, Bern 
Warren, N. (2008). A Review of Studies on the Distributional Impact of Consumption Taxes in 
OECD Countries, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, no. 64, pp. 1-79  
  49 
Appendix A 
Household Budget Survey – Components of consumption and its VAT rates 
Table 11: Components of the HBS and the corresponding VAT rate. Green: reduced rate, blue: special 
rate, orange: standard rate, white: exempted or free from VAT. 
50: Consumption expenditure   
   51: Food and non-alcoholic beverages 
 511: Food     
 512: Non-alcoholic beverages     
   52: Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products 
 521: Alcoholic beverages     
 522: Tobacco products     
   53: Restaurants and accomodation 
 531: Restaurants     
   5311: Restaurants, Cafés and Bars 
   5312: Self-service restaurants and take-away restaurants 
   5313: Canteens   
   5314: At private individuals' place 
 532: Accommodation     
   5320: Accommodation 
   56: Clothing and footwear 
 561: Clothing     
 562: Footwear     
   57: Living and energy 
 571: Rent, mortgage interest, utilities and energy of the main domicile 
  5711: Rent or mortgage interest of the main domicile 
   5712: Utilities of the main domicile 
   5713: Energy of the main domicile 
 572: Rent, mortgage interest, utilities and energy of other domiciles 
  5721: Rent or mortgage interest of other domiciles 
   5722: Utilities of other domiciles 
   5723: Energy (other domiciles) 
 573: Reparations and maintenance of the domicile   
   5730: Reparations and maintenance of the domicile 
   58: Furnishing and current housekeeping 
 581: Furniture, decorations and carpets 
and other floor coverings, incl. repairs 
    
 582: Househ ld lin n and home textiles     
 583: Household- and kitchen appliances     
 584: Tools and equipment for house and garden   
 585: Current housekeeping     
   61: Health expenditure 
 611: Pharmaceutical products, medical supplies and medical appliances 
  6110: Pharmaceutical products, medical supplies and medical appliances  
     6110.01: Medication  
     6110.02: Glasses and contact lenses  
     6110.03: Sanitary material, therapeutic appliances and material  
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 612: Services by physicians and hospitals    
  6120: Services by physicians and hospitals  
   62: Transportation   
 621: Purchase and use of autos     
   6211: Motor cars   
     6211.01: New motor cars  
     6211.02: Second-hand motor cars  
   6212: Motorcycles, scooters and auto cycles 
   6213: Bicycles    
   6214: Gear and replacement parts for vehicles 
  6215: Fuels and lubricants 
   6216: Service and reparation of vehicles 
   6217: Other services related to vehicles 
 622: Transportation services     
   6221: Passenger transport by railway 
   6222: Passenger transport by road 
  6223: Passenger transport by air 
   6224: Passenger transport by inland waterway 
   6225: Combined transport services  
   6226: Other purchased transport services 
   63: Communication   
 631: Postal services     
 632: Devices and services for telecommunication   
   66: Entertainment, leisure and culture 
 661: Audio-visual, photographic and IT equipment and accessories 
 662: Other equipment and accessories for entertainment purpose  
   6621: Durable goods for recreation and sports 
   6622: Toys, games and hobbies  
   6623: Sports and camping equipment and accessories 
   6624: Plants and non-durable goods for gardening 
   6625: Pets and products related to animal keeping 
 663: Services for sports, recreation and culture   
  6631: Services for sports and recreation 
    6631.01: Entrance tickets to sports events 
    6631.02: Services in sports and recreation centres, without ski lifts 
 
    6631.03: Tickets for cableways, incl. ski lifts  
     6631.04: Hire of sports and recreation equipment  
   6631.05: Sports and handicrafts courses  
   6631.06: Music and dancing courses  
   6631.07: Contributions to sports clubs  
   6631.08: Contributions to recreation clubs  
   6631.09: Other courses within recreation  
  6632: Cultural services 
     6632.01: Theatre and concerts  
     6632.02: Cinema  
     6632.03: Museums, exhibitions, libraries, zoological gardens etc.  
     6632.04: Radio and television licences  
     6632.05: Subscriptions to private television  
     6632.06: Subscriptions to cable television  
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     6632.07: Hire of devices and DVD's and CD's  
   6632.08: Contributions to cultural clubs  
   6632.09: Other services within entertainment and culture  
  6633: Gambling  
 664: Books, Newspapers and stationery   
   6641: Books and brochures 
   6642: Newspapers and magazines 
   6643: Other pieces of printed matter 
 665: Package trips     
   67: Education- and training expenses 
 670: Education- and training expenses    
   68: Other goods and services 
 681: Personal hygiene     
 682: Personal amenities     
 683: Social, financial and other services     
  6831: Social services 
  6832: Financial services 
  6833: Contributions to organisations and associations 
  6834: Other services and losses from letting 
 30: Mandatory transfer expenditures   
   31: Social security contributions 
 310: Social security contributions     
   32: Taxes   
 320: Taxes     
 330: Health Insurance: Basic insurance premium   
 35: Monetary transfer payments to other households 
   36: Monetary transfer payments to other households 
 360: Monetary transfer payments to other households   
 40: Other insurances, fees and contributions 
   41: Health insurance: supplementary insurance premium  
 410: Health insurance: supplementary insurance premium   
   42: Other insurance premium 
 420: Other insurance premium     
   43: Fees   
 430: Fees     
   44: Donations, gifts and invitations  
 441: Donations     
 442: Gifts and invitations     
  4421: Gifts: Food and non-alcoholic beverages 
  4422: Gifts: Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products 
  4423: Invitations to restaurants, cafés, bars, take-away restaurants and canteens 
     4423.01: Invitations to meals in restaurants, cafés and bars  
     4423.02: Invitations to non-alcoholic beverages in restaurants, cafés and bars  
     4423.03: Invitations to alcoholic beverages in restaurants, cafés and bars  
     4423.04: Invitations to meals in self-service restaurants  
     4423.05: Invitations to non-alcoholic beverages in self-service restaurants  
   4424: Gifts: Clothing and footwear 
   4425: Gifts: Furnishing and current housekeeping 
   4426: Gifts: Transportation 
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  4427: Gifts: Entertainment, recreation and culture 
     4427.01: Toys and games  
     4427.02: Plants and non-durable goods for gardening 
     4427.03: Books and Brochures 
     4427.04: Newspapers and magazines  
     4427.05: Other pieces of printed matter, writing material and drawing material 
     4427.06: Entertainment, recreation and culture  
   4428: Other gifts   
 80: Premium for life insurance   
Notes: There is an additional subcategory in the HBS, which is not shown here as in almost all cases the tax rates 
are the same. If this was not the case, it was accounted for in the calculation even though not displayed here (e.g. 
in the category Energy of the main domicile one distinguishes between electricity and fuels). Some categories, 
such as Package trips are difficult to assign, as first one cannot separate the expenditure for transportation, 
accommodation and restaurants. If transportation is by air, it is free from VAT. Accommodation would be taxed 
with a special rate, if it were in Switzerland. However, as most package trips have a destination abroad, the 
whole category is declared as exempted. For some categories, the tax rate varies according to whether the 
producer is within the non-profit sector and below a certain turnover threshold (e.g. in sports or cultural 
services). In sports clubs most services are offered from firms or clubs that are not liable to VAT (Lamprecht et 
al., 2011). Hence this category was defined as exempted. Another example is pets and products for their keeping; 
as cat litter is used in agriculture as well it is subject to the reduced rate. However, other products specifically for 
pets are taxed normally. Hence in this case the normal rate was deemed to be more appropriate.  
Sources: HBS (FSO, 2014) and VAT Act (2009), Author’s translations. 
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Appendix B 
Simulation of a tax reform with a uniform rate for all goods 
Table 12: Components of the HBS and the corresponding post-reform tax rates. Purple: standard rate, 
white: exempted or free from VAT. 
50: Consumption expenditure   
   51: Food and non-alcoholic beverages 
 511: Food     
 512: Non-alcoholic beverages     
   52: Alcoholic beverages and tobacco products 
 521: Alcoholic beverages     
 522: Tobacco products     
  5220: Tobacco products 
   53: Restaurants and accomodation 
 531: Restaurants     
 532: Accommodation     
   56: Clothing and footwear 
 561: Clothing     
 562: Footwear     
   57: Living and energy 
 571: Rent, mortgage interest, utilities and energy of the main domicile 
  5711: Rent or mortgage interest of the main domicile 
   5712: Utilities of the main domicile 
   5713: Energy of the main domicile 
 572: Rent, mortgage interest, utilities and energy of other domiciles 
  5721: Rent or mortgage interest of other domiciles 
   5722: Utilities of other domiciles 
   5723: Energy (other domiciles) 
 573: Reparations and maintenance of the domicile   
   5730: Reparations and maintenance of the domicile 
   58: Furnishing and current housekeeping 
 581: Furniture, decorations, carpets and 
other floor coverings, incl. repairs 
    
 582: H usehold linen and home textiles     
 583: Household- and kitchen appliances     
 584: Tools and equipment for house and garden   
 585: Current housekeeping     
   61: Health expenditure 
 611: Pharmaceutical products, medical supplies and medical appliances 
 612: Services by physicians and hospitals    
   62: Transportation   
 621: Purchase and use of autos     
   6211: Motor cars   
     6211.01: New motor cars  
     6211.02: Second-hand motor cars  
   6212: Motorcycles, scooters and auto cycles 
   6213: Bicycles    
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   6214: Gear and replacement parts for vehicles 
  6215: Fuels and lubricants 
   6216: Service and reparation of vehicles 
   6217: Other services related to vehicles 
 622: Transportation services     
   6221: Passenger transport by railway 
   6222: Passenger transport by road 
  6223: Passenger transport by air 
   6224: Passenger transport by inland waterway 
   6225: Combined transport services  
   6226: Other purchased transport services 
   63: Communication   
 631: Postal services     
 632: Devices and services for telecommunication   
   66: Entertainment, leisure and culture 
 661: Audio-visual, photographic and IT equipment and accessories 
 662: Other equipment and accessories for entertainment purpose  
 663: Services for sports, recreation and culture   
  6631: Services for sports and recreation 
  6632: Cultural services 
  6633: Gambling  
 664: Books, Newspapers and stationery   
 665: Package trips     
   67: Education- and training expenses 
 670: Education- and training expenses    
   68: Other goods and services 
 681: Personal hygiene     
 682: Personal amenities     
 683: Social, financial and other services     
  6831: Social services 
  6832: Financial services 
  6833: Contributions to organisations and associations 
  6834: Other services and losses from letting 
 30: Mandatory transfer expenditures   
   31: Social security contributions 
   32: Taxes   
   33: Health Insurance: Basic insurance premium 
 40: Other insurances, fees and contributions 
   44: Donations, gifts and invitations  
 441: Donations     
 442: Gifts and invitations     
 80: Premium for life insurance   
Source: HBS (FSO, 2014), Author’s translations. 
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Appendix C 
Table 13: Income and expenditure for single households 
Single 
Households < 
65 
Gross Income Disposable Income Expenditure 
2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 
All 6349 7126 4376 4916 4268 4434 
Poorest 2632 3076 1896 2282 3138 3043 
2 4693 5094 3305 3713 3650 3659 
3 5960 6415 4274 4617 4034 4316 
4 7248 8018 5091 5579 4506 4752 
Richest 11209 13016 7309 8382 6012 6399 
Note: Values in CHF. The division into quintiles based on gross income is the following: For 2006-2008: 1st: 
below 3925, 2nd: 3925-5336, 3rd: 5337-6505, 4th: 6507-8087, 5th: above 8088. For 2009-2011: 1st: below 4341, 
2nd: 4341–5795, 3rd: 5796–7076, 4th: 7077–9173, 5th: above 9174. Source: Author’s elaboration, based on HBS 
(FSO, 2014).  
Table 14: Income and expenditure for couples 
Couples <65 
Gross Income Disposable Income Expenditure 
2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 
All 11567 11929 8120 8327 6950 6979 
Poorest 5373 5631 3734 3878 4650 4889 
2 8227 8800 5886 6413 5696 5935 
3 10539 10991 7665 7762 6638 6451 
4 13177 13607 9362 9778 7662 7807 
Richest 20488 20595 13933 13791 10093 9805 
Note: Values in CHF. The division into quintiles based on gross income is the following: For 2006-2008: 1st: 
below 7111, 2nd: 7111-9470, 3rd: 9471-11795, 4th: 11796–14804, 5th: above 14805. For 2009-2011: 1st: below 
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7631, 2nd: 7631–9875, 3rd: 9876–12162, 4th: 12163–15340, 5th: above 15341. Source: Author’s elaboration, based 
on HBS (FSO, 2014).  
Table 15: Income and expenditure for couples with children 
Couples with 
children 
Gross Income Disposable Income Expenditure 
2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 
All 10934 11890 7832 8510 7283 7490 
Poorest 5748 6187 4031 4392 4821 4798 
2 8036 8727 5915 6462 5917 6110 
3 9831 10562 7203 7727 6697 6911 
4 12063 13077 8762 9604 7922 8249 
Richest 18985 20884 13247 14353 11053 11375 
Note: Values in CHF. The division into quintiles based on gross income is the following: For 2006-2008: 1st: 
below 7147, 2nd: 7147-8923, 3rd: 8924-10794, 4th: 10795-13686, 5th: above 13687. For 2009-2011: 1st: below 
7777, 2nd: 7777–9657, 3rd: 9658–11534, 4th: 11535–14944, 5th: above 14945. Source: Author’s elaboration, based 
on HBS (FSO, 2014).  
Table 16: Income and expenditure for pensioners 
Pensioners 
Gross Income Disposable Income Expenditure 
2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 
All 4339 3599 3352 3519 3419 3599 
Poorest 2192 2586 1634 1663 2279 2586 
2 2835 2781 2158 2355 2774 2781 
3 3565 3190 2834 2982 3073 3190 
4 4650 3968 3497 3836 3584 3968 
Richest 8430 5465 6023 5408 5376 5465 
Note: Values in CHF. The division into quintiles based on gross income is the following: For 2006-2008: 1st: 
below 2550, 2nd: 2550-3108, 3rd: 3109-4035, 4th: 4035-5516, 5th: above 5517. For 2009-2011: 1st: below 2635, 
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2nd: 2635–3381, 3rd: 3382–4372, 4th: 4373–5961, 5th: above 5962. Source: Author’s elaboration, based on HBS 
(FSO, 2014).  
Table 17: Income and expenditure for pensioner couples 
Pensioner 
couples 
Gross Income Disposable Income Expenditure 
2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 
All 7562 7583 5405 5405 5591 5820 
Poorest 3 538 3734 2477 2486 3503 3783 
2 4 961 5159 3668 3784 4459 4860 
3 6403 6636 4898 4973 5074 5330 
4 8175 8398 6064 6090 6318 6485 
Richest 14702 13940 9896 9660 8585 8619 
Note: Values in CHF. The division into quintiles based on gross income is the following: For 2006-2008: 1st: 
below 4264, 2nd: 4264–5722, 3rd: 5723–7157, 4th: 7158–9495, 5th: above 9495. For 2009-2011: 1st: below 
4470, 2nd: 4470–5869, 3rd: 5870–7363, 4th: 7364–9701, 5th: above 9702. Source: Author’s elaboration, based on 
HBS (FSO, 2014).  
  
